Intrinsic Evil

According to CCC 1755, "A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together." If any of these three is lacking, the act will be evil.

But not all evil acts are intrinsically evil. For that to be the case, the object of the act needs to be bad. Thus 1755 goes on to state: "The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil."

What counts as the object of an act can be difficult to understand. CCC 1751 states:

The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. the object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.

This is rather hard to understand, and it would help us understand how this term is being used if we could get some examples of sins that have an intrinsically evil object. 1755 provides one such example--fornication--and a couple of paragraphs earlier 1753 provided a few more:

A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. the end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.

So in addition to fornication being an intrinsically evil act, lying, calumny, and condeming an innocent person (in context, this seems to be a judicial condemnation) also seem to be intrinsically evil.

There are others examples also, and in Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II provided several lists of examples in order to illustrate the concept.

In my previous post, I noted that John Paul II's citation of Gaudium et Spes' list of social evils cannot be read, without qualification, as a list of items that are intrinsically evil. It is, however, useful for purposes of providing examples of intrinsic evils (this is why the pope made the quotation in the first place), even if significant unstated qualifiers have to be identified in order to fish out acts that are themselves intrinsically evil.

The subsequent sections of Veritatis Splendor also contain what appear to be lists of intrinsically evil acts, and these are worth looking at as well. In section 81, the pope wrote:

In teaching the existence of intrinsically evil acts, the Church accepts the teaching of Sacred Scripture. The Apostle Paul emphatically states:

"Do not be deceived: neither the immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor sexual perverts, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers will inherit the Kingdom of God" (1 Cor 6:9-10).

The pope here appears to take St. Paul's list of mortal sins (or, I should say, of people who commit mortal sins) as providing further illustrations of intrinsic evils, the way that the Gaudium et Spes list did.

Continuing in the same section, he writes:

If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain "irremediably" evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person.

"As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt)—Saint Augustine writes—like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?".

Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act "subjectively" good or defensible as a choice.

Here again the pontiff appears to regard St. Augustine's list as providing further illustrations of intrinsically evil acts.

There is even an earlier reference in section 78, where the pope wrote:

[A]s the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches,

"there are certain specific kinds of behaviour that are always wrong to choose, because choosing them involves a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil" (CCC 1761).

And Saint Thomas observes that

"it often happens that man acts with a good intention, but without spiritual gain, because he lacks a good will. Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused. 'There are those who say: And why not do evil that good may come? Their condemnation is just' (Rom 3:8)."

Here the pope seems to cite St. Thomas giving robbery as an example of an intrinsically evil act. One will also note that "robbers" appeared on St. Paul's list, as did "thieves," and "theft" appeared on St. Augustine's list.

Between the Catechism and Veritatis Splendor, it would appear that the following items can be classed as intrinsically evil:

1. Fornication
2. Lying
3. Calumny
4. Condemning an innocent person
5. Immorality
6. Idolatry
7. Adultery
8. Sexual perversion
9. Theft
10. Greed
11. Drunkenness
12. Reviling
13. Robbery
14. Blasphemy
15. Any kind of homicide
16. Genocide
17. Abortion
18. Euthanasia
19. Voluntary suicide
20. Mutilation
21. Torments inflicted on the body or mind
22. Attempts to coerce the spirit
23. Subhuman living conditions
24. Arbitrary imprisonment
25. Deportation
26. Slavery
27. Prostitution
28. Trafficking in women and children
29. Degrading conditions of work which treat labourers as mere instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons

In my previous post, we saw that many of these items--particularly those from the Gaudium et Spes list (which was in its original context a list of social disgraces or infamies)--need unstated qualifiers fleshed out or they will represent things that can be done in certain situations (e.g., indirect abortion, therapeutic mutilation, legitimate deportation of those who do not meet the just immigration requirements for a state). Others require the unearthing of so many unstated qualifiers that I'm not sure at this moment how to cash them out (e.g., "subhuman living conditions" and St. Paul's reference to people who are guilty of reviling). Still others have fairly clearly worked out definitions. These include fornication, lying, and theft.

It seems to me that if we look at the different sins on this list, they include references to intent or circumstances in the nature of their object.

This is an important point because in the comboxes some appear to have argued that considerations of intent and circumstances are irrelevant to the object of an intrinsically immoral act. In other words, the object of an intrinsically immoral act should be definable without reference to intention or circumstances.

This does not appear to be the case if the items on this list are all intrinsic evils. Let us take the following cases as illustrative since they have clearly worked out definitions: Fornication, adultery, lying, calumny, theft, and abortion.

1) Fornication: According to CCC 2353, "Fornication is carnal union between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman."

2) Adultery: According to CCC 2380, "When two partners, of whom at least one is married to another party, have sexual relations - even transient ones - they commit adultery." So adultery consists in a married person having sexual relations with one to whom he is not married (or having sex with someone that you're not married to).

3) Lying: According to CCC 2482, "A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving."

4) Calumny: According to CCC 2477, one "becomes guilty . . . of calumny who, by remarks contrary to the truth, harms the reputation of others and gives occasion for false judgments concerning them."

5) Theft: According to CCC 2408, "theft . . . is, usurping another's property against the reasonable will of the owner."

6) Abortion: According to Evangelium Vitae 62, "direct abortion" is "every act tending directly to destroy human life in the womb 'whether such destruction is intended as an end or only as a means to an end.'" It goes on to say that this "always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being."

It appears to me that every one of these definitions include elements referring to intention or circumstance.

1) Fornication includes a reference to the circumstance that neither of the parties is married.

2) Adultery includes a reference to the circumstance that one of the parties is not married to the other.

3) Lying includes a reference to the intention of deceiving.

4) Calumny includes a reference first to the circumstance that the remarks are contrary to the truth and second to the circumstance that they harm the reputation of others and give the occasion of false judgments.

5) Theft includes reference to the circumstance that the owner of the property reasonably wills that it not be taken.

6) Direct abortion refers to the circumstance that the child killed is an innocent human being.

In some cases the reference to intention or circumstance is buried deeply enough that we may tend not to think of it, as in the case of abortion. Human nature is such that unborn children are automatically innocent human beings, and we might have to do a thought experiment to surface the hidden reference to circumstance (e.g., by postulating a mad scientist who genetically engineers an unborn baby such that it is not an innocent human being--one that is a fully rational being who first murders its twin and then seeks to kill and somehow has the ability to kill its mother while still within the womb, perhaps by a release of poisons it generates). Despite the bizarre, "Stewie on Family Guy" quality of this thought experiment, it remains the case that--as John Paul II expressed it, "direct abortion . . . always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being," and the innocence of the human being killed is a circumstance of the act.

So it seems to me that one has two choices, either:

i) Say that fornication, adultery, lying, calumny, theft, and direct abortion are not intrinsically evil, or

ii) Say that references to circumstance and intent can be included in the object of an intrinsically evil act.

If a person says (i) then he's going to have to say that the lists of items given in the Catechism and Veritatis Splendor include a lot of things that aren't actually intrinsically evil, in which case the reference to "torments inflicted on the body or mind" may not refer to anything intrinsically evil.

If a person says (ii) then one is going to have to allow the possibility of including references to circumstances or intent in the definition of something like torture and allow that torture is still intrinsically evil. It would then follow that when intention and circumstances are spoken of as sources of morality over and above the object of the act that we are speaking of intentions and circumstances over and above those included in the definition of the act itself.

The latter seems to me to be the clear way to go. I have a much harder time imagining that the Church is wrong to speak of fornication, adultery, abortion, etc., as intrinsically wrong. It seems much simpler to say that the object of an intrinsically evil act can include references to circumstances or intent. Indeed, the difference between fornication and adultery consists in the fact that in the former neither of the parties is married and in the second at least one of them is. That's a difference of circumstance no matter how you slice it.

A careful reading of Veritatis Splendor does not prohibit this understanding. What the pope says is that if the object of the act is sinful then intent or circumstance--intents or circumstances over and above those referred to in the object--cannot make the act good.

This makese sense. If the object of abortion includes killing someone in the circumstance that the person is innocent, and if killing innocents is wrong, then abortion is going to be wrong regardless of what other circumstances or intents may apply to it. You can't justify abortion because of any other intent or circumstance because there is already an evil (the killing of a person who is in the circumstance of being innocent) built into the object of the act.

Similarly, if we define torture such that it involves the disproportionate infliction of pain then we have included a reference to an evil circumstance in the object of torture. Inflicting pain is not itself wrong--otherwise we could never punish people--but to inflict disproportionate pain is wrong.

We see other references to disproportion in other items on the list of intrinsically evil acts. For example: drunkenness. Drunkenness consists in drinking a disproportionate amount of alcohol. If you only drink a proportionate amount (and it can vary by situation, as in the case of needing to use alcohol as an anesthetic so that you can have a bullet removed from your arm in the Old West) then there is no sin. But drinking too much changes the moral character of the act so that it becomes the sin of drunkenness, which John Paul II includes in a list of apparent intrinsically evil acts.

This makes sense if we allow terms like "disproportionate" or "too much" to appear in the object of the act being defined. Drinking too much alcohol is evil, just as inflicting too much pain is evil. Drunkenness--since it involves drinking too much alcohol in its object--will be intrinsically evil, and torture--since it involves inflicting too much pain in its object--will be intrinsically evil.

Either one needs to be prepared to allow this or one needs to allow that the lists included in the Catechism and Veritatis Splendor contain some items that aren't intrinsically evil.

Comments

[Paul H]

Great analysis, Jimmy. Your ability to apply logic and reason to moral theology is very impressive.

[Zippy]

In other words, the object of an intrinsically immoral act should be definable without reference to intention or circumstances.

I don't know if it should be definable, because not everything that is real is definable. Lots of things that we know intuitively - say consciousness or time, as two immediately obvious examples - aren't definable. There is a difference between being able to use a concept in a sentence and have other people understand you and that thing being definable in some rigorously positivist sense.

But the object of the act is indeed independent of intent and circumstances. Otherwise there is really no point to the encyclical at all.

[Paul H]

But the object of the act is indeed independent of intent and circumstances.

Hi Zippy,

Sorry to pick on you again. :-) But would you care to give a specific rebuttal to Jimmy's analysis in this post? All you have done is essentially to state, "your conclusion is wrong", but without giving any counter-argument. I think that Jimmy has made what appears to be an air-tight argument, demonstrating that intent and circumstances CAN be factored in as necessary components of the object of a particular moral act. Where do you find a hole in his argument?

[Josiah]

Great work, Mr. Akin. I couldn't have said it better (or even nearly as well) myself.

[Zippy]

Where do you find a hole in his argument?

I will be busy for a while, perhaps even the rest of the day (the crowd goes wild), but will attempt an in-depth answer when I get the chance. The basic problem is that there is a (positivist) flaw in Jimmy's method. Reality doesn't care what formal language we use to describe it or how our syllogisms fit together. The human act has an object, independent of intent and circumstances, whether or not our ability to describe what is going on is perfectly explicit; and that is really the whole fundamental point to Veritatis Splendour: that certain acts can be evil in their object independent of intent and circumstances. Jimmy's approach is basically to say that that can't be the case because the textual definitions he is using to describe a certain list of intrinsically evil acts involve the invocation of labels that refer to intentions and circumstances. He has mistaken a linguistic limitation for an ontological refutation of the central point of the encyclical.

[M.Z. Forrest]

Certainly a moral act by definition has an object, intention, and circumstance. In dealing with the gravity of the act we are necessarily dealing with intention (outside the proximate intention), circumstance, and proportion. In assigning intrinsic to proportion, we seem to be jumping to a double effect test which seems inappropriate. If we are going to say something is intrinsic to the act, logically we will arrive at the object of the act. Therefore, it would seem logical to differentiate an act as intrinically rather than objectively evil on that basis.

In evaluating torture, the object is to make the torturee a proxy of your will. This can be differentiated from moral correction, because the object of moral correction is perfection of the will of the one being corrected. (Criminal punishment opens up too large a can of worms to get into at this point.)

[esquire]

Zippy:

Exactly! And thank you.

"Jimmy's approach is basically to say that that can't be the case because the textual definitions he is using to describe a certain list of intrinsically evil acts involve the invocation of labels that refer to intentions and circumstances. He has mistaken a linguistic limitation for an ontological refutation of the central point of the encyclical."

There is perhaps a fine line between the "circumstances" of an act, and the "definition" of the act. But clearly there is a distinction. Otherwise VS makes no sense.

Further, the plain meaning of the text in VS is clear.

First, paragraph 79 explictly rejects exactly what JA does in his post, "one must therefore reject the thesis . . . which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its . . . object . . . the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or certain acts apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences"

Further, paragraph 80 is clear and unambiguous on its face:

"These are the ACTS which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed "intrinsically evil": they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, AND QUITE APART FROM THE ULTERIOR INTENTIONS OF THE ONE ACTING AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES. . . . The Second Vatican Council . . . gives a number of examples of SUCH ACTS:. . . physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit".

There is no ambiguity here. Physical and mental torture are always and per se intrinsically evil REGARDLESS of the "ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.

And as far as GS referring to "infamies" instead of "intrinsic evils", clearly JPII understand the linguistics.

In his very next Encyclical after VS, Evangelium Vitae, at paragraph 3 he reiterates this section from GS and referred to the acts decried therein as "infamies indeed".

You simply can't play word games and say that "abortion, or assisted suicide, or torture are intrinsic evils, except when they aren't".

[Jonathan Prejean]

But the object of the act is indeed independent of intent and circumstances. Otherwise there is really no point to the encyclical at all.

I don't think that can be right. What seems to be suggested is that circumstances extrinsic to the act itself cannot remove the intrinsic evil of the fact. But there is surely some minimal threshold of circumstance and intent that are intrinsic to the definition of the act, which would at the very least include the intent to do the act (involuntary actions can't be intrinsically evil).

In that case, it seems to be that what is really intended is that no circumstance extrinsic to the nature of the act itself can render the act not evil. But if a circumstance or intent intrinsic to the act is missing, the act simply isn't the same act that is intrinsically evil.

Not that I'm an expert on these matters. I find myself quite perplexed as to whether circumstances affect the nature of an act per se rather than per accidens (e.g., whether use of a condom renders a sexual act per se or only per accidens inapt for procreation). But I think that there must at least be some sort of distinction between intent and circumstances that are "part of the act" as it were, and perhaps it would be helpful to view the definitions as speaking to the issue of what intent and circumstances are essential to the definition of the act itself.

[Jonathan Prejean]

I hadn't seen esquire's post, but I think it fits rather nicely with mine. The use of the term "ulterior motives" appears to clearly delineate motives other than those intrinsic to the definition of the act.

[Paul H]

Zippy and esquire:

A question for you: In your view, is theft an intrinsically evil act?

[Tom K.]

I still don't think "a disproportionate infliction of pain" is a good definition of torture, but I do think it's a perfectly good definition of an intrinsically evil act.

That is, I think people are perfectly capable of choosing a disproportionate infliction of pain as disproportionate, and that an act with such an object is intrinsically evil.

[Jimmy Akin]

Esquire: You clearly have either misread me or VS or both.

I'm not denying anything JP2 said in either of the passages you quote regarding object, intention, and circumstance.

Please see the former post about "physical and mental torture." This is a mistranslation.

[M.Z. Forrest]

Any definition dependent upon disproportion to define the evil speaks to objective evil. Necessarily all intrinsic evils are objective evils, but it does not follow conversely that all objective evils are intrinsic evils.

[c matt]

You can't justify abortion because of any other intent or circumstance because there is already an evil (the killing of a person who is in the circumstance of being innocent) built into the object of the act.

Similarly, if we define torture such that it involves the disproportionate infliction of pain then we have included a reference to an evil circumstance in the object of torture. Inflicting pain is not itself wrong--otherwise we could never punish people--but to inflict disproportionate pain is wrong.

I think the hilighted portion is at least one point in which the analysis runs into problems. It is placing proportionalism into the definition of the act, thereby removing any chance of ever categorizing the act itself as intrinsically evil as proportion and intrinsic are two mutually exclusive concepts.

The conditions of abortion do not admit to proportion - either you are killing an innocent human in the womb or you are not. The human in the womb can't be "proportionally" innocent, ditto for the other items listed - you cannot be "proportionally married," "proportionally speaking a falsehood," etc. You are either married or not; you are either telling the truth or not. And that is a major point of an intrinsic evil - it simply does not admit of proportion - you do not get around an intrinsic evil by only doing a proportionate amount of it.

I think part of the problem may also be semantics - what we might more properly term "conditions" of an act (that is, factual conditions that must exist in order for the act to be the act - eg, being married or not, being innocent or note) I think Jimmy is labelling "circumstances". And what VS would call circumstances, Jimmy calls extrinsic circumstances.

[Elijah]

Yes, some amount of intent and circumstance is built in to the very definition of the items on this list of intrinsic evils. For example, a single woman who is raped is not guilty of fornication, a person who kills another accidently is not guilty of murder, and so on. So, intent and circumstances can affect whether or not the sin actually takes place, but, if the intent and circumstances that define the sinful act are present, then no additional circumstances or intent can justify the act. Am I summing this up correctly?

Also, where does slavery come from on the list, and why does it seem to conflict with St. Paul's (very limited) writing on the subject?

[M.Z. Forrest]

Fornication is an act of the will. One cannot will to be raped. Sins are not accidents.

[esquire]

Elijah:

I think you're conflating the definition of an act with the criteria for an actor's moral culpability.

c matt is correct. If "proportionatality" is introduced into the definition of an act, then terminating a pregnancy to save the life of the mother, and possibly even to avoid grave harm to the mother, would not be intrinsically evil. And yet we know that it is.

[Elijah]

I don't know what 'conflating' means, but if it means that I'm confusing the definition of the act with culpability then I don't think I am. It's not that a woman who is raped commits fornication but isn't culpable for it; it's that she has not in fact committed the sin of fornication. She has clearly had sexual relations with a man to whom she isn't married, but she has not fornicated because fornication is an intrinsically evil act that can never be justified.

[caine thomas]

There's one aspect to this issue I think needs to be given weight. (It may be in an earlier combox, but I didn't notice)

There is a conscious choice available to the prisoner which may be of substantially more weight than the choice available to the interogator. If you seperate out passive torture from active torture, this certainly comes into play.

Scenario:
A. John Doe knows details of a planned terrorist attack.
B. CIA agent tells John Doe he will not be given food until he discloses information.

John Doe, by not talking, is complicit in potential mass murder, and has opted not to eat.

CIA agent, by withholding food, is trying to stop a mass murder.

If John Doe starves, isn't he mostly to blame for his own death by consciously choosing evil over the good of saving others' lives as well as his own?

Obviously this assumes John Doe has this knowledge, which the interrogator can never know with absolute certainty. However, I don't the dichotomy of actor/victim always applies cleanly in these cases.

[SDG]

I think the hilighted portion is at least one point in which the analysis runs into problems. It is placing proportionalism into the definition of the act, thereby removing any chance of ever categorizing the act itself as intrinsically evil as proportion and intrinsic are two mutually exclusive concepts.

Catholic moral theology as well as proportionalism (or consequentialism) relies on proportionality. The law of double effect presupposes proportionality.

The problem with proportionalism is not that it relies upon proportionality, but that it doesn't admit anything else -- i.e., no absolutes -- whereas Jimmy's approach clearly does involve absolutes.

In no sense, then, can Jimmy's approach be labeled "proportionalist." This is a misuse of words.

[M.Z. Forrest]

Under that logic Elijah, a person who drowns from falling out of a boat has commited suicide. The accidents of suicide are present, but it is obviously not a suicide.

[Esau]

She has clearly had sexual relations with a man to whom she isn't married

Elijah,
I don't believe using the term "sexual relations" especially in the case of rape is appropriate since it implies that it was mutual when clearly the woman was a non-participant, to put things euphemistically.

[esquire]

Well, can someone explain to me what degree of the infliction of pain is "disporportionate" so as to be intrinsically evil?

And also, please explain WHO makes the determination of proportionaility.

If one believes that a certain organization is intent upon mass-murder, and that a prisoner in custody MAY be a member of this group and MAY have information that would help prevent that mass murder, how far can we go with that prisoner without commiting an intrinsic evil?

Because that's what we're really talking about here.

The Japanese subjected American soldiers to waterboarding during a time of out-right war when the very existence of the Japanese Empire was at stake. Was that proportionate?

[Anna]

Esquire,

If "proportionatality" is introduced into the definition of an act, then terminating a pregnancy to save the life of the mother, and possibly even to avoid grave harm to the mother, would not be intrinsically evil. And yet we know that it is.

That would only be relevant if proportionality were introduced into the definition of abortion, which I don't believe Jimmy claimed. The example he used where proportionality was part of the definition was drunkenness. Would you deny that proportionality is part of that definition?

[Elijah]

Esau and M.Z.,

That's my point. I'm saying that intent is a part of the definition of the intrinsically evil act. Since the hypothetical rape victim hasn't willed (intended) her participation in the act, she hasn't committed the sin of fornication. Other intents/circumstances that are not part of the definition of the intrinsically evil act ('I raped her in order to bring about some good') can never justify the act because then the fornication is intended.

[M.Z. Forrest]

The object of drunkness is suppression of the will. In order for alcohol to suppress the will a certain amount of alcohol must be consumed. Proposition is weighting of two goods. Hence, drunkeness is achieved by misallocation of portion, not a misallocation of proportion at least in moral terms.

[SDG]

It appears to me that every one of these definitions include elements referring to intention or circumstance.

So it seems to me that one has two choices, either:

i) Say that fornication, adultery, lying, calumny, theft, and direct abortion are not intrinsically evil, or
ii) Say that references to circumstance and intent can be included in the object of an intrinsically evil act.

It would then follow that when intention and circumstances are spoken of as sources of morality over and above the object of the act that we are speaking of intentions and circumstances over and above those included in the definition of the act itself.

The latter seems to me to be the clear way to go. I have a much harder time imagining that the Church is wrong to speak of fornication, adultery, abortion, etc., as intrinsically wrong. It seems much simpler to say that the object of an intrinsically evil act can include references to circumstances or intent. Indeed, the difference between fornication and adultery consists in the fact that in the former neither of the parties is married and in the second at least one of them is. That's a difference of circumstance no matter how you slice it.

Brilliant, brilliant, brilliant.

This is exactly what I was (less eloquently) getting at in my earlier exchange with Zippy, in which I acknowledged that I was using the word "circumstances" in a way different than is customary in Catholic moral theology, to refer to "differentiators" that are necessary to distinguish intrinsically evil acts from acts that are not evil, or not intrinsically evil.

[Elijah]

And, I think using the term 'sexual relations' in the case of rape is especially appropriate since rape is, by definition, rape is forcing someone to have sexual relations. I don't know how you could rape someone without it involving sexual relations.

[Elijah]

Gah! Strike the last 'rape is'.

[Esau]

No worries, Elijah.

I just had a problem with your using "sexual relations" especially in the repulsive context of rape.

[Esau]

And, I think using the term 'sexual relations' in the case of rape is especially appropriate since rape is, by definition, rape is forcing someone to have sexual relations.

Rape is sexual assualt.

[Jimmy Akin]

I will be busy for a while, perhaps even the rest of the day (the crowd goes wild), but will attempt an in-depth answer when I get the chance.

I have a special request to make.

As a newcomer to the Internet torture debate, I am not familiar with all that has gone before, and it appears that certain conventionalized ways of referring to things have developed.

I am not sure, for example, what sense Zippy is using the words "fungible" and "positivist" in, and I know it would benefit me--and I'm sure numerous others--if the forthcoming response could be written in as newbie-friendly a way as possible, keeping the language simple and either omitting fancy terms (the preferred option) or explaining them when they absolutely can't be admitted.

This might make the reply longer, but I'd glady trade increased length for increased clarity.

Thanks!

[esquire]

anna;

I would disagree that the concept of drunkeness includes an aspect of proportionality. Websters defines "intoxication" as "to affect temporarily with diminshed physical and mental control by means of alcoholic liquor, a drug, or other substance."

Once one's physical and mental control has been diminished, they're drunk (or intoxicated).

Proportionality has nothing to do with it.

You could say that one GETS drunk by drinking disproportionately, but that's not the same thing as saying that some degree of drunkeness is acceptable and some some degree of drunkness is intrinsically evil.

Similarly, while there may be a threshold of PAIN which delineates torture (i.e. a certain level of pain is acceptable but beyond that it constitutes torture). This is analogous to a certain degree of drinking being acceptable (because it does not diminish the physical or mental faculties).

This is NOT, however, the concept of proportionality, which suggests that the degree of pain permitted changes in relation to some external factor.

[John]

Wow that is one long thread post to read on trying to define just what is evil and what is not

Canon Law
JPII encyclicals
Vatican II Gaudium et Spes
Catechism

I cant help but see that abortion is listed as being evil. Turning to sin-any good Catholic from their catechism and as in scripture knows then that anyone who assists one in a sinful act is as wrong as the sinner themself. Does this then apply to the desecration of the Eucharist and its knowing distribution to those in the political areana who are Catholic and promote the death of the unborn ? (Kerry, Cuomo, Pelosi, etc) and those Bishops that allow the administering of this sacrament to them, and after another failed USCCB meeting failed to ban these accomplice to murder-are these Bishops then evil and in mortal sin??

Forget about evil, as that is humanism and JPII preached humanism. As catholics as the church taught for centuries, we are to be concerned about being in a state of sanctifying grace, free of mortal sin and all one really has to know is to follow your examination of conscience (does anyone even review this anymore before one makes penance??)which is a derivative of the 10 commandments and the Council of Trent, which made it quite clear what one needed to be Justified

Canon XXX. In any one saith, that, after the grace of Justification has been received, to every penitent sinner guilt is remitted, and the debt of eternal punishment is blotted out in such wise, that there remains not any debt of temporal punishment to be discharged either in this world, or in the next in Purgatory, before entrance to the kingdom of heaven can be opened (to him); let him be anathema.

Canon XXXII. If any one saith, that the good works of one that is justified are in such a manner the gifts of God, as that they are not also the good merits of him that is justified; or, that the said justified, by the good works which he performs through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,--if so be, however, that he depart in grace,--and also an increase of glory; let him be anathema.

THE SIXTH SESSION: JUSTIFICATION

Canon XXXIII. If any one saith, that, by the Catholic doctrine touching Justification, by this holy Synod set forth in this present decree, the glory of God, or the merits of our Lord Jesus Christ are in any way derogated from, and not rather that the truth of our faith, and the glory in fine of God and of Jesus Christ are rendered (more) illustrious; let him be anathema.

[c matt]

The problem for me anyway isn't so much including an ontological factual circumstance (I would rather refer to this as "condition" to avoid confusion with moral circumstances as used by others - the utlerior motive thing), but with introducing proportion or "sliding scale" or "level" of conduct into the ontological portion of the definition. It seems by doing that, you destroy any ability of truly classifying something a intrinsically evil. Something is intrinsically evil because of the fact you do it, not because of how much or how severely you do it. By introducing a "level" of conduct (i.e., disproportionate) you never can classify a particular act as intrinsically evil by virtue of engaging in the act itself. It will always have to be evaluated in light of the moral circumstances, not just the factual circumstances. The difference between fornication and adultery involves a different condition (married/not married) but not a proportional or level or scale difference - that is one isn't 50% married and therefore adultering, but would only be fornicating if 49% married. I guess what I am trying to get at is that "differentiators" that are necessary to distinguish intrinsically evil acts from acts that are not evil, or not intrinsically evil is not a matter of scale or level or proportion - its a matter of category. And by using a "differentiator" in the definition that introduces scale, portion or level, you undo the concept of intrinsically evil.

whereas Jimmy's approach clearly does involve absolutes

I don't see how as a matter of his definition. What the defintion says is disproportionate infliction of pain. Some things will always be disproportionate (rape) but not because its "torture" as defined, but because the means itself is evil (rape) independent of whether it is used for torture or not. We don't need to know what torture is in order to know that rape is wrong. So his absolutes don't get us anywhere we couldn't get before.

As esquire says above - what about an absolute wrt infliction of pain - how does Jimmy get to the absolute of X amount of pain is absolutely too much? By this definition, we can't get there becuase there is no absolute level/scale/proportion. It all depends upon the end sought (TTB, rescue the kidnapped kid, etc.). If that is the case, then his definition of torture cannot make torture intrinsicaly evil.

Since the hypothetical rape victim hasn't willed (intended) her participation in the act, she hasn't committed the sin of fornication

With the rape scenario, you don't need to inlcude intent in the definition per se to determine that the victim did not comit fornication. Although the object of the act of fornication is intrinsically evil (sexual relations w/ non-spouse) there is no act on the part of victim because she did not choose to do it. Hence, no choice, no object chosen, therefore no act committed (much less a sinful one).

By the way, I would vote for using the terms "factual circumstance" or "condition" for those things we would put into the definition - eg, whether married (adultery) or not married (fornication) and use the term "moral circumstance" for the ulterior motive type of things (eg, to obtain pleasure, for vengeance, etc.).

[rsps]

"What the pope says is that if the object of the act is sinful then intent or circumstance--intents or circumstances over and above those referred to in the object--cannot make the act good."
I don't understand why people are having such a hard time with this? Could it be that in our current state of the world they don't want to have to think about the fact that 'torture' is a question that we must grapple with....and if it occures it is wrong.. a sin....evil?
Jimmy's conclusion above is basic to Ethics 101 taught at any good Catholic High school or University.

[Esau]

As a newcomer to the Internet torture debate, I am not familiar with all that has gone before, and it appears that certain conventionalized ways of referring to things have developed.

I am not sure, for example, what sense Zippy is using the words "fungible" and "positivist" in, and I know it would benefit me--and I'm sure numerous others--if the forthcoming response could be written in as newbie-friendly a way as possible, keeping the language simple and either omitting fancy terms (the preferred option) or explaining them when they absolutely can't be admitted.

This might make the reply longer, but I'd glady trade increased length for increased clarity.

Thanks!

JIMMY AKIN:
You are D' Man!

Just keep up the great work you've been doing, Brutha!

I'm certain there are those who actually appreciate the great lengths at which you've gone to in terms of your comprehensive treatment of this albeit long-drawn out subject that has already progressed through several months already!

;^)

[Paul]

If proportionality is a part of the definition of torture, how do we define what is proportional?

For example is there some correlation between number of years in jail and a finger (Do different finger get different worth?)? So someone in a position to apply the particular infliction can choose between 20 years in prison or a pinky finger? What if the person receiving the pain/mutilation/etc. thinks that one of the two is far less grievous?

So I guess my first real question is, how do we measure proportionality between different kinds of afflictions?

Second, what kinds of afflictions would be considered evil, regardless of their "proportionality"? Raping a subject would be one, for example. Would pretending to harm a subjects family be moral, if you didn't actually harm them or cause them pain? (In one discussion I had with someone on the topic, they suggested using a video where it appears that you are killing the subjects family in real-time, but in reality it is just editing and special effects?)

Third, how does one measure proportionality of pain of the subject to the plight of the victim? Say that someone's life is in danger. And since a human life in infinitely valuable, does that mean that any amount of pain could be used on the subject, since you would never achieve "infinite" pain?

[esquire]

I agree with c matt that "condition" is a much better term than "circumstance." And this is not just semantics.

First, if we use the term circumstance as it relates to intrinsically evil acts, we directly contract Veritatis Splendor, which expressly states that intrinsically evil acts are evil REGARDLESS of the circumstances.

Two people being unmarried is not a "circumstance" of fornication, it is a condition, or requirement of the act.

[rsps]

"but with introducing proportion or "sliding scale" or "level" of conduct into the ontological portion of the definition. It seems by doing that, you destroy any ability of truly classifying something a intrinsically evil. Something is intrinsically evil because of the fact you do it, not because of how much or how severely you do it."

Not so in Ethical debates 'proportionality' is an accepted term that is used primarily in cases where one is reacting to a grave/life threatening situation.
Also there are only instances were 'proportionality' is applicable. Fornication is obviously not one of those instances.

[Jonathan Prejean]

The object of drunkness is suppression of the will. In order for alcohol to suppress the will a certain amount of alcohol must be consumed. Proposition is weighting of two goods. Hence, drunkeness is achieved by misallocation of portion, not a misallocation of proportion at least in moral terms.

That's quite helpful. What distinguishes the use of alcohol as a medical anaesthetic from its use as an intoxicant is double effect. You can intend the object of medical anaesthesia, and if there are proportionate reasons, then it may be used despite the effect of suppression of the will, which is truly unintended. That isn't the same thing as intending suppression of the will as the object, which is intrinsically evil. In fact, if one had the object of suppressing the will even if one also had some other good object in mind, the act of drinking would still be evil. On the other hand, drinking the same amount with some other legitimate object where suppression of the will is unintended might not be intrinsically evil (double effect analysis would apply).

Bringing this back to the case of torture, though, the question is what qualifies as an excessive portion of pain, and it would seem that esquire's intuition is correct that this ought to be determined according to some conventional baseline. There is obviously a threshold of pain that is de minimis, simply part of the ordinary wear and tear of human existence, and one could argue that this degree of pain is not an offense to the dignity of the human person (being awakened at a certain hour, some degree of physical jostling from place to place, use of force against you when you present a threat to yourself or others, corporal punishment as a corrective for misbehavior, criminal punishment, etc.). On the other hand, involuntary sexual degradation (to use Jimmy's example), excessive restraint (other than for the purposes of protecting the prisoner from harming himself or others), and other bizarre mistreatment would be excessive.

I would therefore propose a corrective to Jimmy's definition; it is not "disproportionate" pain but excessive pain that defines torture. If you are inflicting pain beyond what the ordinary dignity of the person allows (which includes being subject to pain as punishment, discipline, medical treatment, and defensive force to prevent imminent harm by that person, plus the ordinary travails of life, but nothing more), then it becomes torture. It is then intrinsically evil.

The question then becomes when pain is "excessive." Zippy is right that the answer must necessarily be intuitive to some degree. But I think a good guideline would be police procedure. There is a certain amount of "roughing up" suspects that is reasonable, but if it becomes a violation of rights, that would be excessive pain. That seems like a pretty good bellwether for the social standard of what is and is not excessive pain.

[SDG]

Proportionality is necessary for defining some intrinsically evil acts.

Take mutilation. We have seen that therapeutic mutilation, e.g., removing a gangrenous limb in order to save a life, does not constitute the sin of mutilation. Yet we cannot distinguish therapeutic mutilation from other mutilation without invoking proportionality. I.e., the harm done via the mutilation must not outweigh the good to be achieved.

Thus, you can amputate a foot in order to save a life from gangrene, but not to cure gout, because the evil of gout is disproportionate to the evil of amputating the foot. The latter is the intrinsically evil sin of mutilation, the former is not; proportionality makes the difference.

Same goes for indirect abortion or surgical sterilization. Surgery that results in the death of a baby or in sterility can be legitimate given proportionately grave medical necessity; but if the medical need is not porportionate, the act is intrinsically evil.

[c matt]

First, should have said this earlier - great discussion Jimmy and thanks for hosting it.

Fungible - I think Zippy means in the traditional commercial sense - that is, milk, soybean, gold, oil, etc. are all interchangeable units. One ounce of gold, soybean, oil, etc. (assuming equal quality, etc.) is just as good as another ounce of the same substance. In the torture scenario, I think he is saying that getting the information from a tortured victim means the same to the torturer as getting it from the daily paper or any other source - hence the human beings are being treated as a fungible (equivalent) source of whatever item is being sought. That is, equivalent to a piece of paper or hole in the ground or piece of meat from where the same item can be retrieved, therefore not respecting the uniqueness inherent in being a human rather than those other things.

Positivist - I'm a little less clear about, but I think by that he means the line of thinking that one can exhaust the meaning of a concept or idea or thing by sufficient articulation of its attributes. That is, by listing specific acts that are intrinsically evil (or maybe even specific attributes of what is extrinsically evil) one can provide the be all and end all of it.

[M.Z. Forrest]

The level of pain involved in cruelty would go to its gravity. I don't see how the object of torture cannot be subversion of the will.

Since this is the second or third time I've seen it, I think it is worth noting that fornication is not exclusive to non-marital relations. Felatio, for example, is fornication within marriage as well as outside it.

To take a little esoteric example, would people consider it licit to use witchcraft upon a person to achieve the location of the TTB?

[Tim J.]

Well, the fact that drunkenness occurs in different people at different levels of alcohol consumption makes the exact line where drunkenness happens hard to spot, but that doesn't keep authorities from establishing guidelines to measure intoxication.

These guidelines may be somewhat arbitrary, but they contain a truth; there is a line somewhere (between drunk and just happy), and though we may not be able to exactly define where that line is, we can use a variety of tests to determine if it has likely been crossed. In some cases it will be obvious, in others, not so much.

What's obvious is that some people are sober, and some people are drunk, so we know that the line really exists SOMEWHERE, even if we can't pinpoint it.

[Jonathan Prejean]

SDG:
Yet we cannot distinguish therapeutic mutilation from other mutilation without invoking proportionality. I.e., the harm done via the mutilation must not outweigh the good to be achieved.

Sure we can. Therapeutic mutilation has a legitimate object corresponding to the nature of the act, so it can be evaluated by double effect (the harm is an unintended consequence of the legitimate object of healing the patient). The proportionality you have identified is just the proportionality of double effect. But if the mutilatory effect were intended as opposed to being an unintended consequence of the legitimate object of the act (healing), then it would still be intrinsically evil.

[esquire]

Correct Jonathan. GS, VS and EV all talk about mutiliation in the context of an affront to human bodily integrity.

In the setting of a gangrenous limb, bodily integrity has already been compromised, and amputation is necessary to restore or prevent further dis-integration.

[Jonathan Prejean]

The level of pain involved in cruelty would go to its gravity. I don't see how the object of torture cannot be subversion of the will.

Somebody might have an overwhelming craving for Doritos, so that offering Doritos would "subvert the will," but not illegitimately. Asking someone questions repeatedly or in a tricky way (such as with mental reservations) might fool someone into saying something that he doesn't actually want to reveal, but that is not illegitimate subversion of the will. All I'm saying is that there would appear to be a threshold level of pain that simply isn't objectively an offense against a person's dignity.

[SDG]

The proportionality you have identified is just the proportionality of double effect.

Certainly. But it's also a necessary differentiator between an intrinsically grave act and a lawful act.

But if the mutilatory effect were intended as opposed to being an unintended consequence of the legitimate object of the act (healing), then it would still be intrinsically evil.

But my scenario proposes a case in which the object of the act is healing (of gout), but the act remains intrinsically evil, because the good to be achieved is disproportionate to the evil of amputation.

In the setting of a gangrenous limb, bodily integrity has already been compromised, and amputation is necessary to restore or prevent further dis-integration.

Bodily integrity has also been compromised in the case of the person with gout... and it wouldn't be hard to tweak the example so that the amputation would be the only way to restore or prevent a further dis-integration of health, even though that dis-integration would remain disproportionately light compared to the amputation itself. In that case, the cure is worse than the disease, and the principle holds.

[John]

I have news for all of you "catechumical lawyers" trying to split hairs on calumny, abortion and other sins as well as "evil"-Try following the commandments as God has given and if your actions, any action may cause harm in any way to another person

I love all of this Modern thought in trying to define evil and sin when one can just look at the Council of Trent documents and past teachings including ones Baltimore Catechism and have quite a good idea

If one is not sure, when you are in your confessional-ask your priest

[Esau]

I have news for all of you "catechumical lawyers" trying to split hairs on calumny, abortion and other sins as well as "evil"-Try following the commandments as God has given and if your actions, any action may cause harm in any way to another person

I love all of this Modern thought in trying to define evil and sin when one can just look at the Council of Trent documents and past teachings including ones Baltimore Catechism and have quite a good idea

If one is not sure, when you are in your confessional-ask your priest

John:
Let these folks continue their debate.
It's finally getting interesting.

By the way, their discussion revolves on the subject of "Torture", as in a past blog post.

I know you and I haven't seen eye-to-eye until recently in the B16 posts, but, if possible, hold off on any comments on this thread.

I want to see where all this is finally going.

God Bless You! ;^)

[Esau]

but, if possible, hold off on any comments on this thread.

John:
I meant, hold off on any not germane to the topic at hand. If you have something, please feel free to contribute, of course!

[Jonathan Prejean]

But it's also a necessary differentiator between an intrinsically grave act and a lawful act.

No, the surgery wouldn't be intrinsically evil if the evil consequence were unintended, even if that consequence were disproportionate. To be intrinsically evil as mutilation, the mutilatory effect would have to be intended; if it is unintended, then even a disproportionate consequence doesn't render the action intrinsically evil.

But my scenario proposes a case in which the object of the act is healing (of gout), but the act remains intrinsically evil, because the good to be achieved is disproportionate to the evil of amputation.

No, that's extrinisically evil. Pertaining to the act itself (the surgery), the object is all good (healing the gout). It is the proportionate evil of the unintended consequence extrinsic to the act that renders it evil. That's why the fact that the consequence is unintended is so important.

[c matt]

We have seen that therapeutic mutilation, e.g., removing a gangrenous limb in order to save a life, does not constitute the sin of mutilation.

Yet we cannot distinguish therapeutic mutilation from other mutilation without invoking proportionality. I.e., the harm done via the mutilation must not outweigh the good to be achieved.

But can't one also distinguish between mutilation and therapeutic mutilation by the fact that one treats the person as an end in himself - therapy to cure the gangrene. The other treats the person as a means (a source of material to inflict pain, get sick pleasure out of, etc.)? The sin of mutilation seems more than just a weighing of harm - its object - what is being chosen - to use a person as a source of material is qualitatively different, not just quantitatively different.

Removing the foot to cure gout may be disproportionate and therefore sinful, but not because it is mulitation, but because it is disproportionate. I have no disagreement that disproportionate acts can render the act evil. My disagreement is that disproportionate acts cannot render something intrinsically evil. Either the act is already evil, thus disproportion is superfluous, or if performing the act under circumstances where it would be disproportionate to do so renders it evil, it could not have been intrinsically evil because you need the disproportionate circumstances to make it so.

Here's how I look at it:

To be intrinsically evil means that Act X is always and everywhere wrong.

Act Y is wrong when done under circumstances where it would be disproportionate.

Therefore, Act Y cannot be intrinsically evil because there could be circumstances where Act Y is proportionate. IE, it is not always and everywhere evil.

By plugging disproportionate act Y into the definition of act X, two incompatible concepts are introduced into the definition - proportionality and intrinsic evil.

That is, Act Y which is only evil because it is done disproportionately, is now called intrinsically evil. But its the disproportion, not act Y that is evil. So you come to a contradiction - you are in the position of saying disproportionate acts are intrinsically evil, but acts that are only evil because they are done disproportionately are only evil because of the disproportion, not intrinsically.

It seems to me that the only way Jimmy's definition can avoid this conundrum is to either drop disproportion from the definition, or conclude that Act Y is not intrinsically evil.

[esquire]

SDG, you wrote:

"and it wouldn't be hard to tweak the example so that the amputation would be the only way to restore or prevent a further dis-integration of health, even though that dis-integration would remain disproportionately light compared to the amputation itself."

It's late in the day and I may be missing something, but I'm pretty sure that sentence is self-contradictory. If amputation is necessary to restore or prevent further dis-integration, then by definition it isn't disproportionate to the condition.

Maybe this is more semantics, but the concept of mutilation includes the idea that you're damaging something good or useful. Removing a non-functioning or, worse, injury-spreading body part is not mutilation in that sense.

[c matt]

I guess my concern is that a definition of torture which includes disproportion as one of the conditions unintentionally sneaks in intent or circumstances over and above those referred to in the object. What are we talking about with disproportion? If I understand correctly ,what we are talking about is wieghing how much pain is inflicted against what is at stake (TTB, kidnap victim). How can this be anything other than letting in consequentialism by the back door? What is it about rescuing the kidnap victim or stopping the TTB that allows us to inflict pain, but consensual euthanasia would not be justified to relieve extreme suffering?

[Esau]

I guess my concern is that a definition of torture which includes disproportion as one of the conditions unintentionally sneaks in intent or circumstances over and above those referred to in the object. What are we talking about with disproportion? If I understand correctly ,what we are talking about is wieghing how much pain is inflicted against what is at stake (TTB, kidnap victim). How can this be anything other than letting in consequentialism by the back door? What is it about rescuing the kidnap victim or stopping the TTB that allows us to inflict pain, but consensual euthanasia would not be justified to relieve extreme suffering?

c matt:

As I recall from our discussion in the other thread "Defining Torture: One More Thought", it appeared that what you were saying was that even what police detectives do in interrogations such as manipulation through psychological means (not physical torture, mind you) and the application of surreptitious tactics which, all things considered, would actually fall into your "you are sinning if you are using people solely as a means to your end" since they are, in this instance, using the kidnapper as a means to their end (i.e., trying to rescue the kidnapped child); that even this was unacceptable and immoral to you.

[Esau]

However, to be fair, I did rather like your comments below:

Here's how I look at it:

To be intrinsically evil means that Act X is always and everywhere wrong.

Act Y is wrong when done under circumstances where it would be disproportionate.

Therefore, Act Y cannot be intrinsically evil because there could be circumstances where Act Y is proportionate. IE, it is not always and everywhere evil.

By plugging disproportionate act Y into the definition of act X, two incompatible concepts are introduced into the definition - proportionality and intrinsic evil.

That is, Act Y which is only evil because it is done disproportionately, is now called intrinsically evil. But its the disproportion, not act Y that is evil. So you come to a contradiction - you are in the position of saying disproportionate acts are intrinsically evil, but acts that are only evil because they are done disproportionately are only evil because of the disproportion, not intrinsically.

[M.Z. Forrest]

Somebody might have an overwhelming craving for Doritos, so that offering Doritos would "subvert the will," but not illegitimately. Asking someone questions repeatedly or in a tricky way (such as with mental reservations) might fool someone into saying something that he doesn't actually want to reveal, but that is not illegitimate subversion of the will. All I'm saying is that there would appear to be a threshold level of pain that simply isn't objectively an offense against a person's dignity.

I don't think bribery (Doritos) would be seeking the subversion of the will, at least intrinsically. That would probably go under a proportionality test of some sort. For example, if I paid for a child prostitute in order to gain her freedom, I wouldn't be subverting the pimp's will. Similarly if offered a terrorist Doritos in exchange for information on the TTB, I have difficulty seeing how the terrorist hasn't used his will to cooperate.

[c matt]

If you are inflicting pain beyond what the ordinary dignity of the person allows (which includes being subject to pain as punishment, discipline, medical treatment, and defensive force to prevent imminent harm by that person, plus the ordinary travails of life, but nothing more)

But your examples don't describe a particular level or ceiling of pain, rather they describe reasons for inflicting the pain.

[Josiah]

C Matt,

I share your concern. If Jimmy's definition of torture were to be adopted by the Church, I think it could be fairly accused of playing word games. It says that it rejects consequentialism when it comes to torture, when in fact it condemns only those acts that would be condemned by a consequentialist.

On the other hand, this wouldn't be the first time that the Church appears to have done something like this. In the case of theft, for example, the Church has introduced the word "reasonable" into its definition of theft (taking property against the *reasonable* will of the owner), such that it isn't clear it is condemning anything more than what a consequentialist would condemn.

I think it would be better to try and define torture in terms of "breaking the will" or some such formulation, as this does a better job of meeting Jimmy's two criteria (conforming to our ordinary notion and being intrinsically evil) than his definition is.

[c matt]

manipulation through psychological means (not physical torture, mind you) and the application of surreptitious tactics which, all things considered, would actually fall into your "you are sinning if you are using people solely as a means to your end" since they are, in this instance, using the kidnapper as a means to their end (i.e., trying to rescue the kidnapped child)

I might depend upon the surreptitious tactics. There may be other objections (eg, is it ok to lie in order to get the info). IIRC, I would not see an objection to using techniques that do not use the person solely as a means. What those techniques might be I am not sure. As a starting point, they must be techniques that seek to work with the subjects' will (persuasion, appeals to conscience, even discussing consequences of choosing one behavior or another as long as not flat out lying or stating consequences that would never come to pass or are immmoral in themselves). If the manipulation you refer to seeks to subvert the subject's will, I would then see it as more problematic. But if purely using the subject as a means, there may be problems. And I think that this becomes manifest when trying to subvert the will of the subject rather than work with it or appeal to it. I will agree this requires deeper thought (much deeper than I am capable of) and better guidance - the kind only the Magisterium is guaranteed.

[Josiah]

C Matt,

One other thing. I don't think it will work to define torture in terms of inflicting a certain amount of pain as this would either allow too much coercion or restrict too much legitimate self-defense. For example, I would want to say that breaking a guy's fingers in interrogation is torture, but if I break a guy's fingers in self-defense, even intentionally, I wouldn't say that I'd tortured the guy.

I wonder if one of the things that distinguishes torture in this case is that every infliction of pain carries with it the implicit threat of more to come unless the person breaks. Even if the inflicted pain is very slight, therefore, the threatened pain is in a sense nearly unlimited.

[M.Z. Forrest]

The problem with defining torture as the infliction of pain is that you are defining torture by its accident. Torture has to be ordered toward something. The problem with claiming that it is ordered toward saving innocents from the TTB is that saving innocents from the TTB is remote.

To take a different example. If I were a soldier, I could licitly fall on a grenade to save my comrades. My death would be foreseen, but it would not be the object of my act. I could not however throw my comrade on the grenade to save my other comrades, because I would violate my comrade's human dignity. I cannot will my comrade to save my other comrades whereas I can will myself to save my comrades.

[c matt]

I think it would be better to try and define torture in terms of "breaking the will" or some such formulation

That was brought up before, and I agree that has some intuitional appeal as well. Someone, somehwere raised some issues (Zippy, I think) but can't recall what they were. As I would incorporate it, I would emphasize that it is the attempt or intent to break the will, regardless of success in doing so.

It would be nice if there were a more centralized place for all this rather than floating around cyberspace.

[Esau]

It would be nice if there were a more centralized place for all this rather than floating around cyberspace.

That's an idea!

Many of the conclusions that some folks are reaching here have already been made in the past!

Talk about duplication of effort!

A centralized location would be ideal!

[Jonathan Prejean]

M.Z. Forrest:
I might have misunderstood what you were saying. My point regarding "subversion" of the will is that there are many activities directed at undermining the subject's desire to decide contrary to the interrogator's will that don't actually deprive the subject of voluntary choice. There would appear to be some degree of pain, inconvenience, or affliction that simply is not objectively sufficient to render the person in question incapable of making a choice, in which case the imposition of this degree of pain, inconvenience, or affliction would simply be to make another choice relatively more attractive, not to subvert the operation of the subject's will. I agree that if the infliction of pain exceeded this threshold, then the object would be to deny the torture subject a free choice in the matter, meaning that the act would be intrinsically evil. I simply think that there is some degree of discomfort that simply does not rise to the level of being objectively sufficient to subvert the will or to offend human dignity, and inflicting that degree of discomfort is not intrinsically evil (and probably not evil at all). Persuading someone to voluntarily take some action is a legitimate object, so long as the means aren't morally offensive.

c_matt:
But your examples don't describe a particular level or ceiling of pain, rather they describe reasons for inflicting the pain.

That's correct. There is no particular level or ceiling of pain independent of the object of the infliction of pain. Some legitimate moral objects in the infliction of pain raise the standard of the level of pain relevant to the object. There isn't an amount of pain simpliciter that makes its infliction intrinsically evil. What is relevant is the object of inflicting the pain. If you are inflicting pain to perform emergency surgery, the threshold is going to be determine by the amount of pain reasonably related to that object. Likewise with punishment, discipline, and restraint. What I am proposing is that the threshold for pain ought to be viewed much like the threshold for alcohol. Just as drinking alcohol is permissible unless its object is suppression of the will (even in some cases where the amount of alcohol would be sufficient to suppress with will, as in the case of medical anaesthesia), so inflicting discomfort on a prisoner is permissible so long as the object is to influence his decision rather than determine it outright (which would be intrinsically evil) and as the means chosen are not themselves offensive to human dignity.

[Ed Peters]

well, i was going to post a really good question, but i don't feel like reading all the other posts to see if someone has already asked it, and I hate it when late comers ask quetions that have already been raised, so i'll just be quiet.

[Esau]

well, i was going to post a really good question, but i don't feel like reading all the other posts to see if someone has already asked it, and I hate it when late comers ask quetions that have already been raised, so i'll just be quiet.

Sorry, Ed. I actually didn't mean it that way.
Please fire away!

I just wished there was a way to amalgamate all the posts from both here and elsewhere in order that folks don't have to re-invent the wheel so-to-speak, and, at this point, that's pretty difficult since the posts are all throughout the Internet, as someone has mentioned.

Also, I think that's one of the primary reasons why Jimmy had made the reasonable request that folks write their reponses in a newbie-friendly way since there are a vast amount of info out there that most of us aren't even aware of.

[Tim J.]

"I think it would be better to try and define torture in terms of "breaking the will""

I think that having the "breaking of the will" as the object of the act is what characterizes the interior disposition necessary for torture to occur.

We may be talking about degrees of pain, but not degrees of torture. An act is either torture, or it is not, and torture is out.

In the case of an innocent person, any amount of pain would be unjust. For a guy who has bragged that he has dropped his girlfriend's baby in a dumpster, some degree of pain may be just (Where is the baby?). A terrorist captured with evidence of an ongoing plan to dirty-bomb several cities at once might (in theory) justify a higher level of pain, but here is the thing -

In no case can the object of the interrogation be to to break the subject's will, or remove free will altogether. A certain level of pain might be permissible to put pressure on the subject's will, but not to the point of overpowering it, because to remove free will is to act against human dignity.

Waterboarding and other methods designed to overpower the human will by creating panic or despair are therefore torture by definition.

We may let the subject know that "we mean business" or "bring them down to earth" by applying different pressures on the will, but we may not remove, negate or overpower the human will.

In the case of a captive who is determined to resist, we may just have to allow ourselves to be victimized rather than abandon our principles - in any case, we can't go in with the idea that we will overpower the will by any means to get what we are after.

[Josiah]

C Matt,

There are two objections to the "breaking the will" formulation that I'm aware of:

1. It's possible to torture someone out of sadism, without caring whether or not the will is broken.

2. The formulation might mean that it would be torture to give someone a truth serum.

There might be something to the first objection as a linguistic matter, but given that inflicting pain on someone out of sadism is uncontroversially evil, I'm not sure if it matters much whether it counts as torture.

As for truth serum, I'm skeptical that there is any such thing or that if there was it wouldn't be torture to force someone to drink it. But I'm open to argument on the point.

[c matt]

My gut tells me that somehow the elements of will and not using the person as a means to an end should be incorporated into the definition, but I can't quite articulate how.

However, some of the hypotheticals give me pause:

In the case of an innocent person, any amount of pain would be unjust. For a guy who has bragged that he has dropped his girlfriend's baby in a dumpster, some degree of pain may be just (Where is the baby?). A terrorist captured with evidence of an ongoing plan to dirty-bomb several cities at once might (in theory) justify a higher level of pain,

I just can't shake the intuition that this allows consequentialist reasoning to sneak in. As the end or reason becomes more grave, it justifies a higher level of pain infliction that, for a lesser reason, would not be allowed. I have a hard time distinguishing this from the end (i.e. preventing a grave harm) from justifying the means (inflicting more pain). Assuming torture, however we define it is supposed to be intrinsically evil, I don't see how we can get to inflict more pain on someone as the ends get more serious. Seems if it is torture at one level, it should be torture at another.

[c matt]

It's possible to torture someone out of sadism, without caring whether or not the will is broken

Perhaps an answer to that may be torture is not just intending to break the will, but not respecting the existence of the subject's will. Under that scenario, whether you intend to break the will, or merely don't give a rat's behind about whether your conduct breaks it or not, it would fall under the definition.

[c matt]

As for truth serum, I'm skeptical that there is any such thing or that if there was it wouldn't be torture to force someone to drink it. But I'm open to argument on the point.

I suppose using the person as an infobot through truth serum (or brainwashing, or some nonpainful technique that removes the ability to make a decision) is using the person as a means to an end and may be intrinsically immoral, even if that would not be considered torture because no pain is inflicted. Maybe we are trying to make the defintion of torture cover too much ground - its not the only intrinsic evil out there after all. And some of the disagreement (and hypotheticals) may involve other intrinsic evils, just not intrinsic evils we would call torture.

[Joe]

Regarding the desire to centralize all communication, it does seem attractive; but, I really don't think it would be that beneficial. I think the duplication of effort could actually be advantageous.

Take, for example, the brain. What a wonderful illustration of God's infinite genius. After suffering severe head trauma--having obliterated portions of their brains-- people have made astounding recoveries, sometimes regaining abilities that were once thought to reside only in the portion of the brain that was obliterated.

What happened?

The millions of cells in the brain were created to duplicate effort. There is a safety in duplication that is not recognized enough. True, centralization has its place, but many blogs and blog threads talking about the same issue actually might be a strength.

P.S. Great post Jimmy. I'm going to have to re-read the post and combox threads a few times to understand this discussion--or to at least catch up to where everyone else seems to be. :)

[Tim J.]

"I just can't shake the intuition that this allows consequentialist reasoning to sneak in."

Well, that bothered me too, and it may be that if coercion is justified AT ALL, then any amount short of breaking the will would be.

At any rate, I don't see how the range of permissible pain could be very wide at all. Even APPROAHING the point of obliterating the will would be a no-man's land.

[Tim J.]

Sorry, "...approaching..."

[Jonathan Prejean]

Well, that bothered me too, and it may be that if coercion is justified AT ALL, then any amount short of breaking the will would be.

No, you just have to define what conduct is aimed at breaking the will objectively rather than subjectively. You could take into account the sorts of things that were discussed above, like inflicting a certain amount of pain often carries the implication of more. If the coercion exceeds the objective threshold (which would probably be whatever would be reasonably viewed by the recipient to be directed at breaking the will), then its object is automatically breaking the will by the nature of the act itself, and it is intrinsically evil.

[Tim J.]

As far as I know, there is no way to measure pain objectively. That need not keep us from setting arbitrary parameters on behavior, but this is more reason to be cautious in approaching anything that might break the will.

[SDG]

It's late in the day and I may be missing something, but I'm pretty sure that sentence is self-contradictory. If amputation is necessary to restore or prevent further dis-integration, then by definition it isn't disproportionate to the condition.

Not so. One can have a pathological and worsening condition that is nevertheless never going to be as grave as an amputated foot. For example, an ingrown toenail.

If we postulate, say, that we are on a desert island where we have no fine tools with which to carefully remediate the ingrown toenail, only a very large and unwieldy axe suitable for cutting off feet (or at least part of the foot), it would be possible to say that we have no way of preventing the ingrown toenail from worsening other than cutting off the toes. But an ingrown toenail would not justify cutting off part of one's foot.

[Rick Lugari]

I'm surprised to see this discussion still going in this direction. It seems futile in light of the Latin text. Torments inflicted on the body or mind is what Pope John Paul II taught is intrinsically evil. I think it is a far better choice of words because its own term carries its definition and it is one which is far more clear and understandable. "Torments" indicates very severe pain - this usage makes what he (Pope JPII) is referring to as well as eliminates any recourse to "but what if we were just trying to...". Granted there will still be some disagreement as to what some people would consider "torments", but it is something we can all know. I suppose it's the sort of thing that we all know in our hearts no matter what side of the "torture" debate you fell.

[Rick]

Is a soldier who is participating in a just war committing an intrisic evil when he stabs and kills an attacking enemy?

clearly, the circumstance is significant.

[joe]

Oops. What a blunder. I meant to address my quetion to Rick, not claim to be him. Sorry.

-that falsehood was not an 'instrinsic evil' because I did not have the intention to decieve... ha

[Rick Lugari]

No problem, Joe.

Is a soldier who is participating in a just war committing an intrisic evil when he stabs and kills an attacking enemy?

clearly, the circumstance is significant.

No the soldier isn't because he is merely defending himself and/or country. Self-defense is not intrinsically evil but the intentional killing of innocent people is. It's not a matter of circumstance but of act[ion].

[Rick Lugari]

Or put better (lest I get beat up)...they are different objects.

[joe]

Isn't the action the same in each case--hand on knife, knife in stomach?

Or are you including in your notion of action, the intent involved? I've never studied moral theology so forgive me if I sound unedumacated. :)

[Rick Lugari]

I'm not a moral theologian either so take this for what it's worth. The moral acts are different because you can defend yourself with a knife in hand or you can intentionally take an innocent life. When you defend yourself (the act) with lethal force if justified, you are not intending to kill the person even if you know he will may die. When you take a knife and intend to kill an innocent person (the act) you are committing an intrinsically immoral act. I'm sure there about a hundred more qualified people around here to explain it. I understand it, but I'm not confident I can explain it without stepping on some terminology bombs. ;)

[Jeff]

Is torture morally neutral matter? No. One cannot torture at will.

Suppose someone is incarcerated in a third-world dictatorship because the police chief has a feud with him. Suppose a Catholic is a prison guard and is ordered by the police chief to torture the prisoner with electric shocks. "Think what fun we'll have! Let's watch him squirm!", says the chief.

Can the Catholic say that because some circumstances justify torture that therefore any circumstaces do? Of course not. And I doubt that any of the "torture apologists" would say anything other than, "Such an action would be unconscionable. This act is simply evil. A Catholic cannot do it."

In other words, in some circumstances torture is intrinsically evil. You can't just do it whenever you want.

How does that render the point of Veritatis Splendor null and void?

Would Zippy really lose his faith if a subsequent encyclical were to clarify the point in favor of Akin's analysis? I doubt it.

Suppose a prospective Catholic were to ask Zippy, "I'd like to be a Catholic, but I simply can't accept papal infallibility. What do you say?" I would guess that Zippy (and myself) would say, "No, no; you can't do that. That's part of the Faith."

My guess is that if a potential convert were to put the same question about contraception, we would respond in the same way: "Catholics can't believe in or use contraception."

But would Zippy really say to someone who said, "You know, I think Akin's arguments are convincing. I see your point, Zippy. But after I get baptized, I'm going to support waterboarding. I just think that it's gross and all and kinda scary. I suppose it might be always wrong. But under the circumstances, I just don't think it is. I'll pray about it, but that's where I stand."

Would Zippy really counsel, "No, wait til you see the light on waterboarding. You can't be a Catholic and believe that. The Church clearly teaches against it"?

I hope not!

If the Pope wants to teach about the liceity of torture, he won't simply list it along with a lot of other things to illustrate a point. That's not a TEACHING ON TORTURE. It's a teaching relevant to torture and has some bearing on the question of whether torture can be considered to address the question directly at all.

When the Church wants to bind consciences on a question--even in a non-infallible way--she addresses it clearly and directly. This is what Pope Paul did in Humanae Vitae.

A teaching ON TORTURE? That would be an encyclical about torture. Or a section of an encylical on torture. Something that says something like, "Now, in the past the Church has engaged in certain actions....We come to the issue of torture....Now, torture consists in....This action is clearly in contravention of the will of God in all circumstances and cannot be countenanced."

Something like that. THAT's a teaching ON TORTURE.

The Church doesn't mention something in a laundry list by way of illustration and expect everyone to take it as a "teaching." Zippy and the others have no evidence saying that it does. And as far as I can see they don't even attempt to bring any evidence forward.

There is no teaching on torture in Gaudium et Spes. There is no teaching on torture in Veritatis Splendor. The mention of torture is by the way, part of discussion, part of an illustration. As such it carries little weight, except as the beginning for future teaching which could cite it as some kind of evidence of the Church's teaching on torture as she tightens up and gets clearer on what precisely She is wrong and under what circumstances.

This is why Fr. Harrison rightly agrees that the Zippyesque approach to the question is "fundamentalist proof texting." It's treating magisterial texts, which often include large amounts of analysis and illustration and discussion and appeal to conscience as a sort of oracular pronouncement, an inspired Holy Writ. This is different from submitting one's judgment to non-infallible teaching, which Catholics must unreservedly do. When the Church wants to bind people's consciences on a question--even provisionally--she treats them with more respect than that. She doesn't simply mention things in long lists of illustrations and consider the matter disposed of.

I'd love to see Jimmy's analysis of this question. What does Church TEACHING consist of? What does the non-infallible ordinary teaching of the Church consist of? How do we know when we are bound to it? How do we tell text of an illustrative or explanatory or hortatory or gestural sort from categorical teaching?

Dulles obviously thinks he is being a faithful Catholic when he thinks the Pope's illustrations in this case problematic and not binding per se. Zippy seems to think that he's a sort of heretic for thinking that. Who's right? Uh, lessee, uh...I pick (eeny-meeny-miney-mo...) Cardinal Dulles!

On the one hand, I've got Zippy's unsupported and unconvincing reasoning out of his own head. On the other hand, I've got the conclusions of one of the great orthodox theologians of modern times. Who's right?

[Zippy]

In other words, in some circumstances torture is intrinsically evil. You can't just do it whenever you want.

This is self-contradictory. If act X is intrinsically evil, then by definition act X is evil in all circumstances (much as I think we spend too much effort on formal definitions and not enough on the true realities they purport to describe).

Oh, and Zippy doesn't advise people at all to not join the Church. Zippy thinks everyone should be baptized and join the Church. But in fairness to the question, if Zippy were asked to be someone's confirmation sponsor and that someone persisted in saying that torture is just fine under some circumstances, Zippy would be forced in integrity to decline to be a confirmation sponsor for that person.

Sorry, just another brief drive by for tonite, and a good evening to all.

[Mary]

If I were a soldier, I could licitly fall on a grenade to save my comrades. My death would be foreseen, but it would not be the object of my act.

Here is an excellent example of intentions being necessary. "Voluntary suicide" is in fact one of the intrinsically evil acts mentioned by John Paul II. This soldier is not commiting suicide, but an heroic act; if, on the other hand, he saw the grenade, realized he could kill himself that way, and threw himself on it in order to kill himself, he would have commited suicide.

By the same token, two Christians are questioned in early Rome. Both confess. One's motive is to not deny God; one's motive is to die. One receives a martyr's crown; one commits a mortal sin.

[Esau]

if Zippy were asked to be someone's confirmation sponsor and that someone persisted in saying that torture is just fine under some circumstances, Zippy would be forced in integrity to decline to be a confirmation sponsor for that person.

Of course, Zippy couldn't care less that even if the hundreds of innocent victims of the 9/11 attacks could have been saved by the simple capture and rigid interrogation of terrorist(s) prior to the time of the attacks, the life of that terrorist is far more precious than those innocent people and shouldn't even undergo a smidgen of psychological interrogation tactics since even these are considered "torture".

See, it's so easy when folks can simply reflect such issues in an ivory tower, with an "holier-than-thou" attitude, looking down from an almighty throne on those who should even dare cross what they've declared to be the moral threshold, without even being in the actual trenches.

Yet, there are those of us who suffered greatly from the tragic events of 9/11 and have, in fact, lost people close to us.

To actually witness folks giving such "preferred" treatment to terrorists, of all things (even ordinary criminals aren't treated with such esteem and have to undergo a barrage of even the most rigid psychological tests), even at the cost of innocent lives, is just too repulsive.

Not to wish any harm on such folks, but it seems that the only way they could ever feel the pain of the tragic events of 9/11, is to suffer personal lost themselves. It's sometimes about walking in someone else's shoes until they come to terms with the other perspective.

[Paul H]

Jeff,

Your comment (two comments above this one) is excellent! For anyone who may have skimmed over it, please scroll up and read the whole thing.

[Esau]

...personal lost, that is, in a similar manner.

But, God forbid that another 9/11 attack (or something even worse) ever happen on American soil again.

Unless, of course, there should be those who would prefer to save the lives of terrorists over those of innocent Americans.

[Paul H]

Sorry, Jeff's is actually FOUR comments prior to my previous comment -- a couple of other comments were posted while I was composing mine. Just scroll up until you see the latest comment by Jeff. :-)

[Paul H]

Zippy wrote:
This is self-contradictory. If act X is intrinsically evil, then by definition act X is evil in all circumstances (much as I think we spend too much effort on formal definitions and not enough on the true realities they purport to describe).

Yes, but isn't that the whole point of Jimmy's posts here -- to define what exactly torture is? In other words, I think that Jimmy is contending that even if torture is intrinsically evil, there may be certain unpleasant interrogation techniques which do not necessarily qualify as torture.

[Esau]

Yes, but isn't that the whole point of Jimmy's posts here -- to define what exactly torture is? In other words, I think that Jimmy is contending that even if torture is intrinsically evil, there may be certain unpleasant interrogation techniques which do not necessarily qualify as torture.

THANK-YOU, PAUL H.!

Finally, someone with REASON!

[T. Chan]

It would help if people read how circumstances can change the species of an action.

For example, see the following:
http://www.unav.es/cdb/dhbapmoralact2c4.html

[Zippy]

I think that Jimmy is contending that even if torture is intrinsically evil, there may be certain unpleasant interrogation techniques which do not necessarily qualify as torture.

If that is all he is contending then I agree, as a quick read of my blog will demonstrate. But that isn't all he is contending. He appears to be contending that it is possible for an act - the same objective act in each case (say waterboarding a helpless prisoner) - to be evil independent of circumstances and at the same time not evil independent of circumstances.

And that is just nonsense on stilts.

[T. Chan]

St. Thomas:
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#10
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#11

plus Fr. Cessario, O.P.:
http://home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c02609.htm

[Jeff]

Zippy, did you ever think of running your theories by a competent moral theologian? Your reasoning is nothing short of bizarre.

Categories of acts--KINDS of acts, that is--can be intrinsically evil. That is how we usually use the term.

But individual acts or acts under certain sets of circumstances can also be intrinsically evil. Suppose for the sake of argument that torture were NOT intrinsically evil. Does that mean that torturing people for fun or out of malice could not be intrinsically evil?

Any given act or complex of acts might be evil, partly evil, possibly evil, or not evil at all. For a moral relativist, any given act of torture must be at least arguably okay and anyway it all depends on your point of view. For someone who believes in intrinsic evils, any given act of torture might be intrinsically evil, that is malum in se. That would be so even if circumstances can change the moral nature of the act.

It would make perfect sense to say to people that they can't simply torture at will.