January 03, 2008
Deafness and the Church
(Jimmy Akin)
When I saw the headline on Zenit "Accommodating the Deaf," two thoughts flashed through my mind: (1) This has got to be one of Fr. Edward McNamara's liturgy columns and (2) I wonder what Ed Peters' response will be?
The first thought came from past experience in decoding Zenit headlines. The second came from the fact that Ed Peters is a canonist with particular knowledge of the deaf community and the Church's relationship with it.
I was pleased, then, when I got an e-mail informing me of this piece on Ed's blog in which he interacts with Fr. McNamara's column.
Dr. Peters finds significant fault with Fr. McNamara's column, and rightly so.
I won't repeat all of Ed's critiques of the column here, but Fr. McNamara was clearly writing out of his depth on this topic. He gave a well-meaning, off-the-top-of-his-head answer to the questions posed to him without displaying familiarity with the relevant Church documents (e.g., papal documents giving permission to sign the Mass).
Ed doesn't point this out in his response, but spending even a few minutes looking in the indices of common reference works would have turned up the very documents that Fr. McNamara needed.
Ed's piece does a good job surfacing problems with Fr. McNamara's column. It also raises a couple of issues on which I'd like to add a few thoughts.
1) One of the subjects Fr. McNamara treats is whether parishes should provide closed captioning of the Mass. Ed makes the point that this would not be preferred because, while deaf people might read the captioning, they could not give the proper liturgical responses in captioning, whereas they can give the responses (e.g., "And with your spirit") in sign.
This is a good point. I would add another reason why captioning would not be preferred. As Ed mentions, there is no agreed upon way to write American Sign Language or other sign languages (yet). The captioning that a parish could provide thus would default to whatever the local vernacular language is (e.g., English, French, Spanish).
The problem is: Giving deaf people captions written in English is not giving them captioning in their own language.
American Sign Language, despite its use in America, is not English. It has different grammar and different vocabulary. It may have certain loan elements from English, just as English has loan elements from French and German and Latin and Greek, but it is not English any more than English is one of its cognate languages.
While there are efforts, like Signing Exact English, to exactly represent English in signed form, this is not the standard language in the deaf community in America. American Sign Language is.
Deaf people may have different levels of skill in reading English, just as English speakers may have different levels of skill in reading Latin, but giving them captioned English is not the same as giving them translation into the vernacular sign language.
2) Fr. McNamara was also asked by his correspondent about the possibility of deaf people entering convents, monasteries, and religious life. In answering, Fr. McNamara focused substantially on the question of whether deaf people could be ordained to the priesthood (which is not the same thing, since one can be in a convent, a monastery, or religious life without being a priest).
Fr. McNamara makes the point that some individuals have physical limitations that prevent them from holding certain occupations, which is true, though he is unfortunately detained by the idea that the priesthood involves a great deal of time listening to people, before ultimately concluding that this is not an insurmountable barrier to the priesthood.
Ed points out the problems with Fr. McNamara's answer here (e.g., there are a lot of deaf people out there who don't have anyone to "listen" to them due to lack of priests skilled in sign languages), but I would raise a question in this area.
It doesn't actually concern whether deaf people can be ordained to the priesthood. As Ed points out, the former canonical prohibition on this has been removed from the law and there are, indeed, people who are deaf and who have then been ordained (as well as hearing people who were ordained and then lost their hearing).
My question concerns not ordination and deafness but ordination and something that often goes along with deafness: muteness.
For someone to be ordained to the priesthood, he should be able to validly perform the functions of the priesthood, including the celebration of the sacraments. Indeed, if someone where physically unable to perform these functions it would raise a question (in my mind, at least) about the validity of his ordination, just as the antecedent, total, permanent, and incurable inability to perform the marital act would imply the invalidity of a marriage.
Now, the sacraments involve the use of certain formulas ("This is my Body . . . ," "This is the cup of my Blood . . . ," "I baptize you . . . ," "I absolve you . . . " etc.)
Christian Tradition has established that these formulas do not have to be delivered in a particular language. They can be in Aramaic, Greek, Latin, French, English, Russian, Igbo, or thousands of others. But all of those languages have something in common: They're spoken.
Sign languages are not spoken, and we may here have a relevant difference.
If we look to the requisite matter of the sacraments, we find that there are restrictions on the types of matter, within broader categories, that can be used. Baptism has to be done not with any liquid but with water. The Eucharist must have not any food and drink but wheat bread and grape wine.
We might find that similar limits exist regarding the kind of language that is used in the forms of the sacraments. It might not make a difference what specific tongue you say them in--any more than it matters what kind of wheat or what kind of grape you use--but it might be necessary that you say them in a tongue--a spoken language.
If so then there would be a problem ordaining someone to the priesthood if that person is incapable of vocalizing at least the sacramental formulas needed for validity.
This is an area that I don't think the Magisterium has yet entertained. Individual bishops may have ordained deaf people--who may have varying degrees of muteness--to the priesthood, but I don't think that the Magisterium as an entity has yet considered the question of whether spoken language is required for sacramental validity--at least I am unaware of any place where it has weighed in on the issue--and I could see it going either way on the question.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (106)
September 11, 2007
Yes, Virginia, You Can Be Denied Communion
(Jimmy Akin)
Especially if you're a pro-abort politician or similarly manifestly grave malefactor.
GET THE STORY FROM ARCHBISHOP BURKE.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (218)
September 10, 2007
NEWS FLASH: Catholic Church expects faithful to follow her rules!
(Jimmy Akin)
Actually, with the lead-in that Ed uses for his post, I thought at first he was talking about this story.
In the latter story, the priest who got arrested said he did what he did because he sweats too much otherwise.
Uhh . . . that's why God created running shorts.
I think there are other issues going on.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (22)
June 22, 2007
The Annulment That Wasn't + Quadruple HUH????
(Jimmy Akin)
Canonist Ed Peters points out two extraordinarily important facts regarding the Kennedy-Rausch annulment case that I hadn't been aware of. If press accounts are accurate then . . .
1) The Rota was serving as a court of second instance.
This is an extraordinarily important fact. Here's why: When an annulment case is handled by a tribunal and a finding of nullity is reached, it is automatically transmitted to an appellate tribunal (a court of second instance) for its evaluation. Only if the appellate tribunal agrees is the person free to marry in the Church.
This means that what is popularly known as "an annulment" (that's a colloquial designation) actually consists of two separate findings of nullity by two separate tribunals.
Normally the appellate tribunal that hears the case in second instance in an American annulment case is also in America, but it's possible to appeal directly to the Rota, which is apparently what Sheila Rausch-Kennedy did in this case.
This means that Joseph Kennedy never had "an annulment."He never got the second finding of nullity from the appellate tribunal.
It is not the case--as I had supposed--that Kennedy received "an annulment" (findings of nullity from both the courts of first and second instance) and then the Rota got involved (as a court of third instance) and overturned the annulment. There never was an annulment because the second finding of nullity had not come in.
2) The Rota sat on this case for TEN YEARS.
That's a QUADRUPLE HUH????
The Boston archdiocese tribunal apparently issued its finding of nullity in 1997 and the case has been stuck in the Rota ever since!
This is simply appalling.
John Paul II twice in his annual addresses to the Rota scolded them about not processing cases in a timely manner.
In his 1984 address, after the release of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, he stressed:
In the reform of canonical procedural law, an effort was made to meet a very frequent criticism, which was not completely without foundation, concerning the slowness and excessive length of trials. Therefore, accepting a deeply felt need, without wishing to impair or in the slightest way to diminish the necessary guarantees offered by the course and formalities of tribunal procedure, [the new law] has sought to render the administration of justice more flexible and functional by simplifying procedures, speeding up formalities, shortening the time-limits, increasing the discretionary powers of the judge, etc.
This effort must not be rendered vain by delaying tactics or by a lack of care in studying cases, by an attitude of inertia that is wary of entering the new track for moving ahead, by a lack of expertise in applying the procedures.
We then turn to the 1983 Code and find that it provides that:
Can. 1453 Without prejudice to justice, judges and tribunals are to take care that all cases are completed as soon as possible and that in a tribunal of first instance they are not prolonged beyond a year and in a tribunal of second instance beyond six months.
Got that?
Tribunals of second instance are supposed to process cases in six months barring special circumstances that would interfere with the execution of justice. Yet the Rota sits on this thing for ten years! Further, if what Time said is accurate then even after it reached the finding, it still took two years to draft the statement announcing its finding.
Circumstances in which justice would require this kind of delay are almost unimaginable. On its face the situation appears to be one of gross negligence on the part of the Rota.
Justice delayed is justice denied, and on the face of it, the Rota denied justice to Kennedy and Rausch for years by taking twenty times longer than the law specifies to process their case.
Now, maybe there are facts that we aren't aware of that would show that justice required this astonishingly slow pace, but (by definition) it would be astonishing if there were.
In his 1996 Rotal address, John Paul II spoke of the need to resolve the question of what a person's marital status is (are they validly married or not?) in a timely manner, stating in part:
At the same time, however, the current legislation of the Church shows a deep sensitivity to the requirement that the status of persons—if called into question—does not remain in doubt for very long.
The current legislation of the Church may show that deep sensitivity, but in this case--on the face of it--the Rota did not.
And sadly, this is all too often the case--in tribunals around the world. A friend of mine has a relative who has been vainly trying for years to get a Mexican tribunal to take action regarding an annulment case concerning a marriage that was contracted in Mexico, yet the person has been unable to get the tribunal to do anything at all.
If you want know why America has so many annulments compared to other countries, a significant part of the reason (you'll note I said "part") is that it has a tribunal system that actually processes cases in something like the time limits specified in the law instead of letting them sit for years without resolution or refusing to even take action on the case.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (80)
June 21, 2007
TIMEwits!
(Jimmy Akin)
Okay, the folks at Time Magazine have once again demonstrated their incompetence.
CHT to the reader who e-mailed asking confirmation of the fact that the Church does not "de-sanctify" marriages.
It doesn't.
Time doesn't know what it's talking about.
What it does do is sometimes declare them null from the beginning. Hence: an-nul-ment.
Saying something was null from the beginning is not the same as stripping it of sanctity. It has to be there before you can remove its sanctity. No thing, no sanctity.
Oh, and the correct word for removing the sanctityof a thing would be desecrate or deconsecrate, not "de-sanctify."
But the stupid stuff in the story doesn't stop there! Oh, no! That would be too easy!
EXCERPTS:
The annulment was the subject of Rauch's 1997 book Shattered Faith, which lambasted her ex-husband and was severely critical of the Catholic Church's proceedings, which made the marriage (which had produced twin boys) null and void in the eyes of the church.
How many children a union produced has nothing to do with whether the marriage was validly contracted on the wedding day. Time is presenting criticism of the concept without presenting the rejoinder.
Rauch argued that Kennedy was able to unilaterally "cancel" nearly 12 years of marriage because of his clan's influence in the church.
How long a union lasts has no direct bearing on whether it was validly contracted on the wedding day. Same problem as before, and petitioners cannot "unilaterally cancel" anything. Both parties are given the opportunity to provide evidence, and it's the tribunal that makes the decision.
Few observers thought the appeal to Rome by Rauch, an Episcopalian, had a chance against the well-connected Kennedy.
Time needs better observers. First, the fact Rauch is an Episcopalian is not going to have a material impact on the decision, and Kennedy's connections--whatever they may be in Massachusetts--are not going to be decisive in Rome.
With divorce strictly prohibited in Catholicism, annulments allow Catholics to remarry before a priest and continue receiving the sacraments.
Civil divorce is not "strictly prohibited in Catholicism." Civil divorce can be legitimate for any number of reasons. What you can't do is get remarried just because you have a civil divorce.
Several years after his 1991 civil divorce to Rauch, Kennedy obtained an annulment from a Church tribunal in Massachusetts so he could have a Church ceremony with Kelly. The couple had already been married in a 1993 civil ceremony, but needed the Roma Rota appeals tribunal at the Vatican to uphold the Massachusetts annulment verdict before they could be married by a priest.
The Rota does not weigh in on each and every finding of nullity in the world. It's agreement isn't necessary unless one of the parties appeals to it. (Oh, and you don't have to be married by a priest in order to observe the Catholic form of marriage.)
At the Vatican, Pope Benedict XVI has indicated that he wants to streamline the Roma Rota to respond to the desire of divorced Catholics to stay inside the Church.
Huh? When did he do that? He's never made any statements about streamlining the Rota. On the contrary, he's stressed that tribunals around the world should follow the detailed instructions of Dignitas Connubii.
But there is also concern that some Catholics, particularly in the U.S., abuse the practice. "People think it's their right," says one Rome-based canon lawyer. He adds sternly, "It's not a right."
Double huh? It's not individual Catholics who "abuse the practice" of granting annulments. Only Church tribunals can grant annulments. If there is a generalizable problem (and this is something that is quite arguable) with the annulments being granted then the fault lays with the tribunals granting them, not simply the people asking to have the validity of their marriages examined.
The story also refers to multiple unnamed "sources," meaning that there is a shadow of doubt over the whole thing.
It also says this:
The Roma Rota's ruling, written in Latin, was reached in 2005, and had been kept secret while the official written notice was being prepared, said a source in Rome familiar with the case.
We can't know if this is true since the source is unnamed, but if it is: Triple huh? What's something like this doing sitting on someone's desk for two years? It doesn't take that long to prepare a written notice!
While Time Magazine has demonstrated what it doesn't know about this case, Ed Peters has some sage advice to remember what we all don't know about it.
GET THE STORY.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (107)
April 17, 2007
"Several Days Before Or After"
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
Jimmy, I have a question about indulgences and the only answer I have been able to find is 'a few days'.
What is the timeframe in which one has to make confession and receive communion in order to obtain an indulgence?
It's understandable that there would be confusion on this point. In his apostolic constitution Indulgentiarum Doctrina, Paul VI merely wrote:
n.8—The three conditions may be fulfilled several days before or after the performance of the prescribed work; nevertheless it is fitting that Communion be received and the prayers for the intentions of the Supreme Pontiff be said the same day the work is performed.
In the absence of further clarification, what "several days before or after" means would be a natural source of perplexity. Fortunately, in the year 2000 the Apostolic Penitentiary (which has charge of issuing indulgences) issued a notice titled The Gift of the Indulgence clarifying the question as follows:
5. It is appropriate, but not necessary, that the sacramental Confession and especially Holy Communion and the prayer for the Pope's intentions take place on the same day that the indulgenced work is performed; but it is sufficient that these sacred rites and prayers be carried out within several days (about 20) before or after the indulgenced act. Prayer for the Pope's intentions is left to the choice of the faithful, but an "Our Father" and a "Hail Mary" are suggested. One sacramental Confession suffices for several plenary indulgences, but a separate Holy Communion and a separate prayer for the Holy Father's intentions are required for each plenary indulgence.
Even "about 20" (an eye-opening number!) isn't a fixed deadline, but at least it gives us an idea of the scale we're talking about, and since it's only "about 20" then for practical purposes it would be to safe to saw "within three weeks" (potentially even a little more, but presumably less than a month or they would have just said "a month").
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (9)
March 28, 2007
Bringing Children to Mass
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
I have a baptized daughter who is a few months old. My wife and I went home to my parents this weekend. They went to Church Saturday night as we were visiting other relatives. On Sunday morning my mom offered to watch our daughter while we went to Church. I agreed.
On the way to church I began to wonder if not brining my daughter to church was a sin. Was it? And how grave was it? I abstained from communion because I wasn't sure.
I'm not clear from your answer whether you took your daughter to Mass Saturday or if it was just Sunday morning when you didn't take her to Mass. Either way, it doesn't matter, because a child that young is not required to attend Mass. The Code of Canon Law provides:
Can. 11 Merely ecclesiastical laws bind those who have been baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it, possess the efficient use of reason, and, unless the law expressly provides otherwise, have completed seven years of age.
The law regarding who has to go to Mass on Sunday (or Saturday evening; either satisfies the Sunday obligation) does not specify an age. It simply says:
Can. 1247 On Sundays and other holy days of obligation, the faithful are obliged to participate in the Mass.
Moreover, they are to abstain from those works and affairs which hinder the worship to be rendered to God, the joy proper to the Lord’s day, or the suitable relaxation of mind and body.
Since there is no specification of age here, canon 11 means that children under 7 years of age (or people who lack the use of reason or people who are not baptized) are not bound to attend Mass.
It thus was not a sin to leave your daughter in the care of your mother.
Parents do have a moral obligation to ensure that as their children age, they get in the habit of going to Mass so that once the obligation kicks in at 7 years of age they're used to it, but this is not an obligation that means they have to be there every single Sunday, and it certainly does not mean that children less than a year old have to be taken to Mass. Children that young are incapable of forming the habit of going to Mass.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (134)
March 21, 2007
Switching RCIA Classes?
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
I have spent many years as an active Christian in a Protestant church, but about 2 yrs ago I began reading the early church fathers and suddenly my eyes were opened to the Truth of Catholicism! I have been studying ever since and am involved with several online Catholic groups.
My question is:
Since I am anxious to enter the RCC and I have studied extensively, is there a reason/need for me to go through almost 18months (including Inquiry) of RCIA? I have another year to go in this particular RCIA but I am struggling with some things. The candidates and catechumens are doing the exact same program, no consideration is made for previous Christian life whatsoever (our priest has delegated RCIA to the facilitators and will not intervene). The candidates are required to participate in the scrutnies etc. I know that it says in the RCIA manual (thanks to your website :o)) that candidates do not participate in scrutnies and sent the info along to my facilitators and they said "technically scrutnies do not apply to you but we have decided that everyone will participate in them". I endured sitting through a movie entitled "The Fourth Wiseman" which was RCIA's version of sharing the gospel.
Should I submit to everything this RCIA demands out of obedience to the church or should I go across town to another RCIA who is willing to look at each person's history and take that into account? I talked with this other RCIA and they are eager to help me enter the RCC sooner than NEXT Easter Vigil.
I want to be in full communion with the Church and I hunger for the Eucharist! I do not think I am demanding anything the Church does not make allowances for but I do not want to be rebellious in any way.
Could you please help me with this?
Until you mentioned that there is a nearby RCIA program that would be willing to help facilitate your entrance into the Church by actually obeying the National Statues for the Catechumenate--which require that people not all be treated like catechumens--I was going to suggest that you hold your nose, grit your teeth, and tough it out. In other words, just do whatever you have to to get into the Church, which is the important thing.
That's what I had to do. I had an awful RCIA program, and the parish I was attending refused to comply with Church law, which requires that candidates for reception into the Church who have already lived lives as catechized Christians are to be sorted out from the uncatechized and be given abbreviated periods of formation and then received into the Church apart from Easter Vigil.
Unfortunately, I was in a town where there were only two Catholic churches, and I didn't have another alternative.
Neither do many people.
But if you are in the fortunate situation of having another RCIA program available to you that actually will follow the law then by all means make use of it!
There is zero problem with obedience on your part regarding this. You have no obligation whatsoever to stick with an RCIA program that is refusing to follow the law if you have the alternative of one that is. The obedience problem isn't yours; it's theirs.
If I were in your shoes, I'd count myself fortunate at having made the discovery of the other option and then waste no time in following it up.
Welcome home!
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (37)
February 28, 2007
Why Doesn't The Church Bar Pro-Abortion Politicians From Communion?
(Jimmy Akin)
This is a GREAT question!
The way the law is written, it would seem to do so--at least in normal circumstances--since any perservering in manifest grave sin are to be denied Communion, and typical politicians who are pro-abort would seem to be persevering in manifest grave sin.
I'd be up for barring the whole lot of them.
But one should recognize the consequences of doing so, and these consequences may not always be good, depending on the circumstances. Consider this case:
In 1989, the Bishop [Maher of San Diego] barred a California Assemblywoman, Lucy Killea, from taking Communion because she supported the right to abortion. He told her that her views amounted to "a grave scandal against the Church."
The action drew nationwide attention to a bid by Mrs. Killea for a seat in the State Senate. It also created voter sympathy for Mrs. Killea, a Democrat, who won the seat in a heavily Republican district.
It's an interesting question: "What do you place first? Your native pro-life instincts or possible longer-term harm to innocent life?"
I know what my instincts say . . . but longer-term questions also have to be asked. . . . And this kind of calculus may be part of why some bishops don't take a more confrontational line with pro-abort politicians.
Or maybe not.
GET THE STORY.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (87)
Ecclesia Suplet
(Jimmy Akin)
Church law honors the principle that in certain circumstances, ecclesia supplet: "the Church supplies."
But what is it that the Church supplies?
Is it jurisdiction for situations in which a person operating in the name of the Church lacks the faculties to execute a particular act?
Or is it the grace that would come from a sacrament that would otherwise be invalid?
Has God promised to grant grace through the sacraments even when they are administered invalidly?
We must be careful about the answer.
ED PETERS ADDS CLARITY.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (11)
February 23, 2007
Number Of Holy Days Of Obligation Falls In UK
(Jimmy Akin)
The U.S. BCL Newsletter reports:
Holydays of Obligation in England and Wales
The Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales has recently revised its policy on Holy Days of Obligation, approving the transfer to Sundays of those Holydays of Obligation which are Solemnities of the Lord, namely, Epiphany, Ascension and The Body and Blood of the Lord. The decision was confirmed by the Holy See on July 13, 2006.
The Newsletter of the Committee on Liturgy of that Conference explains that due to the importance of these days “the bishops were anxious that all members of the Catholic Church should be able to celebrate them. The bishops have long been concerned about the way that large numbers of the faithful are unable to take part in the celebration of Mass on days of obligation which fall during the week. Their consultation within their dioceses, and in particular the representation made by Councils of Priests, persuaded that it was now timely to approve the change.”
Flipping to the appendix of my copy of the Red Code, that leaves the non-Sunday holy days of obligation in England and Wales as the following:
1. the Nativity of our Lord Jesus Christ
2. the Epiphany (transferred to Sunday if falls on Saturday or Monday)(now always Sunday)
3. the Ascension(now always Sunday)
4. the Body and Blood of Christ(now always Sunday)5. Holy Mary the Mother of God
6. her Immaculate Conception
7. her Assumption (transferred to Sunday if falls on Saturday or Monday)
8. Saint Joseph
9. Saint Peter and Saint Paul the Apostles (transferred to Sunday if falls on Saturday or Monday)
10. All Saints (transferred to Sunday if falls on Saturday or Monday)
Since most JA.O readers are Americans, they'll likely be curious how that compares to our situation. According to the USCCB's complimentary norm on the subject, our non-Sunday holy days of obligation are:
1. the Nativity of our Lord Jesus Christ
2. the Epiphany(always on a Sunday)3. the Ascension (may be on a Sunday depending on which ecclesiasical province you live in)
4. the Body and Blood of Christ(always on a Sunday)5. Holy Mary the Mother of God (not if it falls on a Saturday or Monday)
6. her Immaculate Conception
7. her Assumption (not if it falls on a Saturday or Monday)
8. Saint Joseph
9. Saint Peter and Saint Paul the Apostles10. All Saints (not if it falls on a Saturday or Monday)
Both of these schedules are robust compared to Canada, of course. Its non-Sunday holy days are as follows:
1. the Nativity of our Lord Jesus Christ
2. the Epiphany(always on a Sunday)
3. the Ascension(always on a Sunday)
4. the Body and Blood of Christ(always on a Sunday)
5. Holy Mary the Mother of God
6. her Immaculate Conception
7. her Assumption
8. Saint Joseph
9. Saint Peter and Saint Paul the Apostles
10. All Saints
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (247)
February 09, 2007
Abortion/Excommunication Mess
(Jimmy Akin)
There are press reports about an Austrian bishop saying that a business owner who rented shopping mall space to an abortion clinic has excommunicated himself.
HERE'S JOHN ALLEN'S VERSION OF THE STORY.
Allen goes a bit too far when he says:
It’s long been a subject of debate whether more remote forms of cooperation, such as the contractor who builds a clinic, also trigger automatic excommunication.
Not that I'm aware of. Not in serious canonical circles.
The canon that provides automatic (latae sententiae) excommunication for abortion is this:
Can. 1398 A person who procures a completed abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.
As phrased, that would strike only the person who has actually procured the abortion. However, canon 1329 also provides that:
§2. Accomplices who are not named in a law or precept incur a latae sententiae penalty attached to a delict if without their assistance the delict would not have been committed, and the penalty is of such a nature that it can affect them; otherwise, they can be punished by ferendae sententiae penalties.
The clause in blue allows not only the procurer of the abortion to be struck with automatic excommunication but also those directly involved in the abortion itself, such as the abortionist, the person who paid the money for the abortion, and possibly a few others (nurses, the person who drove the patient to the clinic). It does not apply to people whose cooperation is more remote and thus whose role might have been substituted for by someone else. At least, in the absence of an authentic interpretation to the contrary, it is doubtful whether the law applies to remote cooperators, which means that the following canon kicks in:
Can. 18 Laws which establish a penalty, restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law are subject to strict interpretation.
That means that in cases of doubt you have to give the benefit of the doubt to the person who would be struck by a penalty.
Since the cooperation of a person who rents space to a "sexual health clinic" that performs abortions is only remotely involved (like the people who supply electric power and gas and who stamp the legal forms at city hall and to handle the clinic's money at the bank, and who provide cleaners, and who provide medical supplies), you can't--as the law presently stands--say that these people are automatically excommunicated.
The green CLSA commentary on the Code concurs:
A properly strict interpretation means that the canon applies primarily to those directly participating in the abortion, not those removed from such participation [p. 1603, n. 308].
If a bishop with the proper jurisdiction over the shopping mall owner concludes that the owner is gravely at fault for renting space to the clinic (an extremely resonable conclusion) then he could declare an excommunication (ferendae sententiae), but it would not be an automatic (latae sententiae) excommunication.
My sense on this is that the Austrian bishop (apparently an auxiliary of Cardinal Shonborn) simply misspoke, which is why Cardinal Schonborn hasn't backed him up.
In any event, the press reports on this are a mess.
MORE FROM ED PETERS.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (79)
February 08, 2007
Canon Law Or Catechism?
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
I wanted to comment on this section [i.e., Marriages in Church] but did not want to contradict what you have stated.
Don't worry about contradicting me. That wasn't a Rule 20 post, so there was no "e-mail me if you want to object to my answer" rule in effect.
I do have a question, why did you cite the Cannon Law and not the Catechism also?
CCC 1621 – 1624 give a good idea of where we are obliged to get married and why.
We, ordinary lay people, do not have access to the Cannon Law nor do we always understand it.
Why didn’t you include the CCC in your answer?
Well, the truth is that I was writing late at night and didn't think to look in the Catechism, but there's a deeper reason than that.
Part of my philosophy is going straight to the source documents whenever possible. That's why I quote from these documents regularly when I'm writing and thus "show my work" (as my math teacher used to insist), rather than simply giving the answer and expecting the reader to just trust me. I've seen a lot of people--particularly clerics and professors--just say "This is the way it is" without giving the questioner a way to follow-up on the answer and verify that it's correct.
I don't have a clerical collar--or even a degree in the relevant fields--and so I have no institution endorsing my answers (particularly when I'm writing here on my blog). They have to stand or fall on their own merits, and it's a lot easier on me--and builds confidence on the part of the reader--if I simply quote the relevant documents up front so that the reader can see for himself what they say. He is then in a position, or a better position, to evaluate whether the answer I am drawing from them is correct. It's part of how I try to build and maintain a reputation for accuracy and reliability.
This approach means that I need to cite the most relevant, most authoritative documents I can, and in the case of the legal obligation of Catholics to celebrate sacramental marriages in Catholic churches, the most relevant and authoritative document is the Code of Canon Law. It is this document that creates the obligation in the first place.
It's true that the Catechism is more familiar to most readers, but it is not a legal document and does not create legal obligations for the faithful. Instead, it is a teaching document that is meant to impart doctrine.
I thus cite the Catechism when I'm handling doctrinal questions, and I cite the Code when I'm handling legal questions.
Sometimes I provide links to the source documents on the Vatican's website, though these two documents are so well-known and so often-quoted on my blog that I often assume that readers will know how to get to them if they want to look up the context of the parts I've quoted. That may be a bad assumption on my part--particularly in regard to new visitors to the blog--but I already spend more time than I should on the blog, and not adding a link to these two documents every time I quote them is an extra time-saving step for me.
This is probably a good place to link to them, though, so new readers will have a jumping-on point, so:
and
And as an added bonus,
So--in keeping with my time limits--once I've identified the most relevant and authoritative documents to quote, I just use them and don't generally have the luxury of quoting other documents in addition (something that would only cause my blog posts to expand beyond their current lengthy lengthiness anyway).
Thus I didn't bother looking in the Catechism.
Had I done so, I might not have quoted CCC 1621-1624 in my answer, anyway. Of these paragraphs, the most relevant one is 1621, but it has some limitations in addressing the question. First, it only addresses the custom in the Latin Rite. That's not too much of a limitation, though, since the person asking why marriages are celebrated in churches likely had the Latin Rite's practice in mind. Second, and more significantly, the paragraph doesn't really talk about why Latin Rite marriages are celebrated in churches. It talks about why they are celebrated (normally) in Masses.
If I used this as the basis of my answer, I wouldn't have dealt with the situations of marriages which aren't celebrated during Mass but nevertheless are celebrated in Catholic churches, and I wouldn't have been able to appeal to the fact that the relevant canon in the Code of Canon Law draws a distinction between sacramental and non-sacramental marriages (which is highly important to answering the original question) since the Catechism doesn't go into that.
I also would have had to extend the discussion by sketching the chain between normally having weddings during Mass and normally having Masses in churches. It was just a lot simpler to go straight for the spot in the Code where it says you've normally got to have sacramental marriages celebrated in churches.
That being said, CCC 1621 can shed extra light on the reasoning behind the law, and it's worth looking at in that regard--as additional insight on the law, but not as law itself or as an exhaustive answer on the reasoning behind the law.
Hope this helps!
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (5)
February 07, 2007
Marriages In Church
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
I’ve been looking for a really solid explanation of why Catholic weddings are ordinarily required to be in a Church. I have many friends that often ask me this question, but sadly I think my answers are not as good as they could be. Obviously, having a wedding in a Church emphasizes the sacramentality thereof, and it is a testimony to the faith community’s part in the couple’s life.
Thank you for your assistance.
There are two ways to approach the answer to this question. The first is the canonical approach. Catholic weddings are ordinarily celebrated in a church because the Code of Canon Law provides the following:
Can. 1118 §1. A marriage between Catholics or between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic baptized party is to be celebrated in a parish church. It can be celebrated in another church or oratory with the permission of the local ordinary or pastor.
§2. The local ordinary can permit a marriage to be celebrated in another suitable place.
§3. A marriage between a Catholic party and a non-baptized party can be celebrated in a church or in another suitable place.
Since most Catholics are either marrying other Catholics or baptized non-Catholics, section 1 applies, which indicates that the marriage is to be celebrated in a parish church unless the local ordinary (typically the bishop) or the pastor gives permission for it to be celebrated in another church or oratory (meaning, due to another canon we won't go into, another Catholic church or oratory).
At first glance, the canonical answer may not seem that enlightening: "Catholic weddings are normally held in Catholic churches because that's what the law says." Big deal. We probably could have guessed that, and the reader is likely wanting an answer from the other perspective, which is why does the law say this? What's the reason for the law?
Here is where a close reading of the canon is helpful. It's always at least a little risky to speculate on the motives behind the law, but the structure of this canon gives us a pretty clear indication of the reason for the law, and it indicates that the reader is on the right track.
If one party is Catholic and the other is either Catholic or another Christian then section 1 wants to locate the ceremony in a Catholic church or oratory, though with permission of the local ordinary it can be celebrated in another suitable place (such as a Protestant's home church if the Catholic is marrying a Protestant), according to section 2.
The permission of the local ordinary goes out the window, though, if the Catholic is marrying a non-baptized (i.e., non-Christian) person. In that case it can happen in a Catholic church or in any suitable place, no permissions needed.
This suggests that there is a difference between the marriages of Catholics to other baptized people (Catholic or not) and the marriages of Catholics to non-baptized people. In the former case, sections 1 and 2 apply. In the latter case, section 3 applies.
Since all Catholics are baptized, that means that this canon draws a distinction between marriages that occur between two baptized people (sections 1 and 2) and marriages that don't occur between two baptized people (section 3).
Now: What's the big difference between marriages between two baptized people and marriages that aren't between two baptized people?
That's right: The former are sacramental and the latter are not.
So the reader is on the right track in identifying the sacramentality of the marriage as the key issue.
I'd be inclined to put it like this: Marriage between baptized persons is a sacrament, and sacraments are normally performed in church. To a significant extent, that's what churches are for. They're the places we (ordinarily) perform our sacraments.The reasons for this seem to be twofold:
1) Churches are places specially consecrated to God, making them sacred, and sacraments are sacred actions, making it natural to perform them in churches.
2) Sacraments are also ecclesial (church-related) acts, and it is thus natural to perform them in the presence of the church when possible. Churches (considered as buildings) are places where the church (considred as people) meets, and so it is natural to perform ecclesial acts in the presence of the members of the church in the house in which they meet.
There are exceptions to this. In some cases there is a good reason to vary from the practice. For example, sick people often can't get to church, so the anointing of the sick is often administered to them where they are. But in the main, the two above reasons are good reasons why sacraments--including marriage--are normally performed in churches.
It doesn't have to be that way, which is why canon law allows exceptions, but it is fitting that it be this way, which is why canon law establishes this preference.
As the green CLSA commentary on the Code of Canon Law puts it:
Since the marriages of two baptized persons are sacraments, they are not merely private or familial celebrations, they are ecclesial events. The spouses declare their consent "before God and the Church" and live out that commitment in and with the support of the local ecclesial community. It is, therefore, fitting that this celebration should take place in the parish church. It is here that the local community is "gathered together by the preaching of the Gospel of Christ, and the mystery of the Lord's supper is celebrated, 'so that the whole fellowship is joined together by the flesh and blood of the Lord's body'"[p. 1337].
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (15)
January 31, 2007
Old Religious Objects
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
First, I very much enjoy your blog. I hope you can keep at it for long time. Now, my question concerns what is the proper way to dispose of religious objects such worn out bibles, tarnished or worn crucifixes, old prayer cards, broken rosaries, religious pamphlets, etc.? Some of my coworkers and I had a discussion today about what to do with them. One person couldn't bring himself to dispose of them in the trash out of respect. Another felt that broken or worn items could be thrown out without any guilt. Can you help us out? We all want to do the right thing.
The disposition of this type of religious object is not something that is regulated by canon law. Consequently, there is not a canonical "right answer" here.
Catholic doctrine also does not treat the subject in any detail, and thus there is no doctrinal "right answer" beyond the general axiom that a religious object should be treated with the reverence that is due it. The question is: How much reverence is that?
It is difficult to give a definite answer, but there are certain levels of reverence that would clearly be wrong. For example:
1) So little reverence that we commit actual sacrilege with the items (e.g., using them as part of a Black Mass)
2) So much reverence that we can never get rid of them and have to squirrel them away when they can no longer be used.
The correct answer falls somewhere between these two extremes, and it is likely to vary from one object to another. Indeed, a pious custom of many Catholics is to distinguish between those objects that have been blessed and those that have not. This appears to be a useful division in that in the case of blessed objects, the Church has in at least a minor way consecrated the item to sacred use, while in the latter case it has not. It thus would make sense to show more reverence in the disposition of a blessed object than an unblessed one.
Correspondingly, a common pious custom is to dispose of blessed objects by either burning them (if they are flammable) or burying them (if they are not). In the former case, the object is destroyed, thus removing its blessing, and the ashes (or other remains) can simply be thrown away.
In the case of objects that were never blessed (or that have been destroyed, removing their blessing), this custom holds that they can simply be thrown away like any other non-blessed object.
As indicated, this is a pious custom and not a matter of law or doctrine, so individual consciences may vary without there being sin. If one person feels comfortable disposing of a religious object in a way that happens to be different than my preferred way of doing it, I would not on that account tell him he's doing anything wrong. If the Church wanted to mandate ways of doing this, it would.
The key thing is not the physical manner of disposing of these objects but the fact that one is doing so with a right heart. If one "reverently throws away" something then his heart is displaying reverence, which is the important thing. What physical act is used to express this reverence is not what is at issue--be it burning or burial or even if there is no outward act but simply a grateful recognition of the role God has allowed the object to play in one's religious life.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (26)
January 17, 2007
Serious Consequences for Catholic Non-Voters
(Jimmy Akin)
It is being reported that a Nigerian bishop is encouraging his flock to vote, informing them that it is their sacred duty to do so, and even going to the extent of saying that they will not be allowed to receive Communion if they do not register to vote.
It's not clear if these reports are accurate, but some of the handling of them in the press is demonstrably *in*accurate.
In particular, the statement that non-registering Catholics will be excommunicated is flatly wrong. Refusing someone Communion is not the same as excommunicating them.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (10)
December 23, 2006
A Christmas Two-Fer Mass Fulfillment?
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
Just a quick question. December 25, 2006 falls on a Monday and it's a holy day of obligation. If a person normally goes to Sunday mass at 5 pm, will he fulfill his Sunday obligation on Dec 24, 2006 and at the same time fulfill the Christmas Day obligation (being that it will be the Christmas vigil mass at 5 pm Sunday)? Or does he have to go to an early Sunday mass (before the Christmas vigil) to fulfill his Sunday obligation (and of course go to another mass for Christmas)?On a related note, if a person goes to a funeral or wedding mass on a Sunday, does this fulfill his Sunday obligation?
According to the Code of Canon Law,
Can. 1248 §1. A person who assists at a Mass celebrated anywhere in a Catholic rite either on the feast day itself or in the evening of the preceding day satisfies the obligation of participating in the Mass.
I've put two phrases in this in color. Given the way the red one is phrased, the law would appear to allow one to go to one Mass on Sunday evening (and after 5 p.m. would certainly count as evening, though some earlier masses might count as well) and simultaneously fulfill one's Sunday obligation and the obligation of a holy day that falls on Monday.
But the law doesn't mean that.
This isn't clear from the text of the law itself, unfortunately. This is one of the areas where we bump up against the fact that Italy is a high-context culture that doesn't write the law in the level of detail that would be expected in English- or German-speaking cultures, because it is assumed that you already know the answer to certain questions and thus they don't need to be written down.
This is one of those questions: It is expected that everybody knows that if Christmas falls on a Monday then you have to go to Mass twice. You can't just go to one. This is the common and constant opinion of learned persons, and so it's what the law means even though it's not what the law says. The Code provides:
Can. 19 If a custom or an express prescript of universal or particular law is lacking in a certain matter, a case, unless it is penal, must be resolved in light of laws issued in similar matters, general principles of law applied with canonical equity, the jurisprudence and practice of the Roman Curia, and the common and constant opinion of learned persons.
This canon applies to the situation of how to apply canon 1248 when it comes to the question of fulfilling two Mass obligations by attending a single Mass. We don't have anything from Rome saying that you can do this, and "the common and constant opinion of learned persons" is that you can't, so you can't.
I find it frustrating that the law isn't written with the level of specificity that makes this clear, but then I don't get to write the law.
You've therefore got several options for how to fulfill your Sunday and Christmas obligations this year:
1) Go to a Saturday evening Mass (Sunday obligation) and a Sunday evening Mass (Christmas obligation)
2) Go to a Saturday evening Mass (Sunday obligation) and a Monday Mass (Christmas obligation)
3) Go to a Sunday Mass (Sunday obligation) and a Sunday evening Mass (Christmas obligation)
4) Go to a Sunday Mass (Sunday obligation) and a Monday Mass (Christmas obligation)
5) Go to one Sunday evening Mass (Sunday obligation) and a second Sunday evening Mass (Christmas obligation)
Now, beyond that, it doesn't matter what kind of Mass it is you are attending. It can be a wedding Mass or a funeral Mass. It also doesn't have to be a specifically Christmas vigil Mass to fulfill one's Christmas obligation. It just has to be a Mass occurring on Sunday evening or Monday.
This is often surprising to people because there is an assumption out there that you need to hear a particular set of readings (i.e., the readings for that Sunday or readings for Christmas) in order to fulfill a Mass obligation, but this is not true, and this time the law makes it clear. That's why I put the phrase "anywhere in a Catholic rite" in blue in canon 1248. This makes it clear that you don't have to attend a Latin rite Mass to fulfill a Mass obligation, and this means that you don't have to hear any particular set of readings to fulfill your obligation. Different rites use different readings, and in many cases, the different rites will not even be celebrating the same holy day and won't have any special readings.
The issue of what readings you hear is thus irrelevant to your fulfillment of your obligation to participate in Mass.
But you do gotta go to Mass twice this weekend, once to celebrate Our Lord's Resurrection and one to celebrate his Birth.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (76)
November 22, 2006
Excommunication
(Jimmy Akin)
Canonist Edward Peters has a new book out on excommunication.
I'd say that this is a much-misunderstood topic except that this would not remotely convey just how misunderstood the topic is. It would be like saying that the ocean is a little wet. In fact, excommunication is so vastly, hugely, wave-crashingly, tsunami-style misunderstood that one almost never encounters a press story about excommunication that gets it right.
It's such a relief, therefore, to have a sound canonist like Peters explain--in simple, layman's terms--exactly what excommunication is and is not, why it gets imposed, what its effects are, and a host of other questions on this horrendously-gotten-wrong topic.
The book is short, easy-to-read, and written in an accessible question-and-answer style.
And with Peters writing, you know you'll be getting a rock-solid, straight-shooting orthodox explanation.
BTW, Peters has promised JA.O an exclusive interview on the subject. Look for it soon!
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (15)
November 02, 2006
A Canadian Drinan?
(Jimmy Akin)
Remember this guy?
If you were politically conscious in the 1970s, you may.
It's the man who introduced a resolution for the impeachement against Richard Nixon.
But how could a priest do that? Don't you have to be a member of the House of Representatives to introduce a resolution for impeachment?
Well, this man is a priest and was--at the time--a member of the House of Representatives.
He was a Democratic representative from Massachusetts, a Jesuit, and his name is Fr. Robert Drinan.
He was also vocally anti-war and vocally pro-abortion--at least in terms of the legality of abortion (he claimed to be privately opposed to it with one of those "personally opposed but . . . " rationalizations of babykilling).
And Drinan's disgraceful performance is one of the reasons that, when the 1983 Code of Canon Law was released, it was made absolutely clear that priests are not to hold such offices. Already, under the 1917 Code, there were severe limitations on what kind of political offices priests could hold, and the Drinan scandal was so shocking that John Paul II took steps to get him out of office (Drinan eventually complied by not running for re-election to a fifth term) and to ensure that in the future priests would not follow in his footsteps. Thus the current Code of Canon Law provides:
Canon 285 §3
Clerics are forbidden to assume public offices which entail a participation in the exercise of civil power.
So why are there now reports of a Canadian priest trying to become the Robert Drinan of the Great White North?
ED PETERS POINTS OUT HOW CANONICALLY SUSPECT THIS ALL IS.
PREDICTION: This dog won't hunt. The Holy See will become involved in the question and order the Canadian priest not to hold elective office if he doesn't back off on his own.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (48)
October 09, 2006
Anointing In Extremis
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
I have a question that arose in a discussion of Brideshead Revisited, but I suppose the answer has practical application today too. You're probably familiar with the fictional scene, but to summarise, in BR, the dying Lord Marchmain has been persisting in manifest grave sin for quite a long time, and when lucid, refuses the sacrament of anointing of the sick. Soon, when he is almost gone and unable to protest, members of his family bring in the priest again, Lord Marchmain is anointed and makes the sign of the Cross.
Lord Marchmain's family and the priest seem to be violating Canon Law as currently set out (although obviously the book is set in the 1930s), as
Can. 1006 This sacrament is to be conferred on the sick who at least implicitly requested it when they were in control of their faculties.
Can. 1007 The anointing of the sick is not to be conferred upon those who persevere obstinately in manifest grave sin.
Has canon law / Catholic practice changed, or are they violating something? What ought to be the position of Catholics today in a similar situation with a lapsed, dying relative?
In the story (and I'm going from my memories of the DVDs, here), Lord Marchmain was living in an illicit sexual relationship with a woman after he left his wife. When near death, he came home and his family urged him to receive the sacrament of extreme unction. At the time, he protested, saying that he was not in extremis (basically, at the point of death itself). This then became a point of argument in the family: Was he rejecting the sacrament or was he rejecting it now, with the expectation that he would receive it when actually at the point of death? When he reached that point and was unable to speak, the family had the sacrament conferred on him, and he made the sign of the cross, signaling that he accepted what was done for him.
Now let's deal with the canonical aspects of the situation.
Let's deal with the situation in the 1930s first, because canon law has changed.At the time the story is set, the 1917 Code of Canon Law as in effect, and according to that Code:
Canon 942
This sacrament is not to be conferred on those who are impenitent, persevering contumaciously in manifest mortal sin; if there is doubt about this, it should be conferred under condition.Canon 943
Nevertheless, [the sacrament] should be absolutely conferred on those who, when they were in possession of their faculties, had at least implicitly asked [for it] or who seemed to ask [for it], even if they later lost their senses or the use of reason.
BUY
THE OLD CODE (IN ENGLISH) HERE.
It seems to me that the fact pattern in the story (as I remember it) allows for Lord Marchmain to have received the sacrament under the 1917 Code. It was not clear at the time of his reception that Lord Marchmain was impenitent regarding his illicit sexual relationship. The relationship had clearly ended (he wasn't engaging in illicit sexual activity from his deathbed), and his objection to receiving the sacrament on the grounds that he wasn't in extremis could be construed as a sign that he wished to receive the sacrament when he was at the point of death. That would be taken as an indicator of a desire to get right with God before dying and thus of not being impenitent. At least there was doubt about this, which would have allowed the sacrament to be conferred conditionally under canon 942.
But 942 isn't the whole story, because there was still 943. According to this canon, even if there is doubt about whether the person is penitent (note that it begins "Nevertheless," presumably setting aside what the preceding canon had just said in the case it is about to examine), the sacrament is to be administered unconditionally if the person requested it. The request for the sacrament thus seems to be taken of itself as at least enough of a token of penitence that it can be administered absolutely, even in cases of doubtful penitence.
Lord Marchmain's objection to receiving the sacrament when he wasn't in extremis could reasonably be taken as an implicit request for the sacrament, triggering 943 and allowing the sacrament to be administered absolutely.
Either way, under 942 or 943, it seems to me that his reception of it was licit, and the fact that he made the sign of the cross signalled that those around him had guessed right: At least by the point of his death, he did want to receive it and the graces it offers, allowing us to reasonably infer the salvation of his soul, notwithstanding his prior illicit sexual relationship.
Now, let's flash forward to today. How would the law handle the same situation under the 1983 Code of Canon Law that is presently in force?
It seems to me that it would handle it in basically the same way. Given the right of the faithful to receive the sacraments unless specifically prohibited by law (Can. 843), and the requirement to subject laws that restrict the exercise of rights to a strict interpretation (Can. 18), there is a duty to read canons 1006 and 1007 (which the reader quoted) in a strict fashion, meaning: In cases of doubt, you err on the side of the faithful's ability to receive the sacrament.
It is reasonably arguable that Lord Marchmain implicitly requested the sacrament, and as long as this is reasonably arguable then canon 1006 would allow him to receive it.
Canon 1007 would not block him from receiving it because it was at least reasonably arguable that he had repented of his illicit sexual relationship sufficiently that he did not "persevere obstinately in manifest grave sin." Once again, as long as it's arguable, you have to read the law in favor of administering the sacrament.
So while this is an extreme case--which is what Evelyn Waugh meant it to be as part of his exploration of the human condition in Brideshead--it seems to me that both under former and current law it would be licit to administer the sacrament to him.
Fortunately for the reader, Waugh also included him making the sign of the cross, telling us that giving him the sacrament was the right thing to do and allowing us to--at least in terms of the story--infer his salvation.
Regarding situations in which a person has not made an in extremis statement like Lord Marchmain's, it should be pointed out that it is fairly easy to satisfy the requirement for making an implicit request. On this point the most informative official discussion is found in the document "Pastoral Care of the Sick: Anointing and Viaticum" (found in The Rites, vol. 1), which contains the official texts for the celebration of the sacrament. According to its introduction,
14. The sacrament of anointing is to be conferred on sick people who, although they have lost consciousness or the use of reason, would, as Christian believers, have at least implicitly asked for it when they were in control of their faculties.
The way I read that (notice it says "would" not "did"), for practical purposes (and given the requirement to err on the side of administering the sacrament), if you've got a person who is about to die and can't speak for himself (or who is otherwise gravely ill and can't speak for himself) then the fact that the person was a Catholic and maintained some kind of Catholic identity (even if he didn't practice his faith regularly) can of itself be taken as evidence that the person would want the sacrament in these circumstances unless the person specifically indicated otherwise. Thus in the case of most dying relatives, even if they weren't active in their Catholicism, their desire is to be presumed unless they said that they don't want the sacrament on their deathbed.
In other words, there doesn't have to be a distinct, overt action whereby a person requests or hints that he wants the sacrament. If he's a Catholic then, since this is what Catholics are supposed to have done for them, you presume it's what he wanted unless you know for a fact otherwise. The mere maintenance of some form of Catholic identity is to be taken as an implicit request for what Catholics should have done for them unless he said he didn't want it.
BTW, on a related note, I'm looking forward to going to Rome next year as part of Catholic Answers' 2007 pilgrimage/cruise. I hope to send back photos of all the sacred monkeys in the Vatican.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (8)
October 06, 2006
The Excommunication Blotter
(Jimmy Akin)
Ed Peters has periodically noted that it is often private individuals who begin worthwhile initiatives that the Church may eventually take up. For example, the first efforts at codifying canon law were private initiatives, and eventually the Church came out with the first Code of Canon Law (1917).
Now Ed has come up with such an initiative himself. A decade ago, he predicted that excommunications would become more common in the Church, and there certainly have been more public reports of excommunication in recent years.
But there's a problem: We're now living in an age of global travel and communications, and unless steps are taken to allow the faithful to know who is and is not subject to excommunication, the rapid travel and instantaneous communicatoin that now exist can thwart the disciplinary force of excommunication.
If there's an excommunicated person from a distant country who's taken up residence in your town and become involved in the local Catholic community, how are the faithful supposed to check out whether or not he's been excommunicated? Figure out what his home diocese was and then call a chancery in a country where you don't speak the language? Or what if the excommunicated person stays in his home country and sets up a web site that people from your parish are reading? How are you supposed to learn of his excommunication? He won't want to advertise it on his site, and he may even have technical-sounding arguments for why he's not excommunicated.
There needs to be a central, Internet-accessible registry of excommunicated persons just like there are such registries for sex offenders.
Ideally, this would be hosted on the Vatican's web site.
But the Holy See hasn't started such a registry (yet), so Ed has begun one.
And, hey, if someone in the Vatican is reading this, Ed's onto a good idea here. Y'all start one soon! It would really help clear up a lot of confusion if individuals could simply point to a registry entry to prove which people are excommunicated and thus should be regarded with caution by the faithful.
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (39)
October 04, 2006
Parental Advice & The Seal Of Confession
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
If the parent of an adult knew his son was going to confession, and told the priest in advance, instructing the priest what kind of advice to give his adult son, and if the priest cooperated in giving that advice, does that violate the seal of confession in some way?
Given only the facts that you mention, the answer is that this would not violate the seal of confession.
For a violation of the seal to occur the priest must, in one way or another, disclose both the identity of the penitent and the sin that was confessed. It is not sufficient for a violation of the seal to simply say merely "John Smith came to me for confession" or merely "Someone confessed to me the sin of adultery." However, if the identity of the penitent can be linked with the sin confessed then there is a violation, even if the linkage is accomplished in a roundabout way (e.g., "'John Smith came to me for confession and someone--wink, wink, nudge, nudge--confessed the sin of adultery").
N.B.: While saying "John Smith came to me for confession" does not violate the seal, the disclosure of even this amount of information would give Rome the willies in most circumstances.
From the above it is clear that no violation of the seal occurs if a priest merely listens to advice regarding what he ought to say to a penitent. As long as he (directly or indirectly) discloses no information about the penitent that can be linked to what the penitent confesses then the seal is not violated.
This is a very dangerous situation, however, because a priest listening to such advice might even inadvertently disclose such information--e.g., by thoughtlessly saying, "Good idea; I'll mention that next time," or even too enthusiastically saying "Thanks!" or just nodding at the wrong moment or appearing too interested in the advice or even just listening to it for long enough that the mere fact of listening sends the signal that the advice is relevant to what he experiences in the confessional with the penitent. Any of these--if the advice concerned a sin that the penitent was likely to confess--would allow the identity of the penitent and the nature of the sins confessed to be linked, and thus some form of violation would occur.
The safest thing for a priest to do if offered such advice by a parent (or anybody else) would be to refuse to listen to it.
Failing that, the priest would need to set up clear and explicit hedges to block the inference that the parent's advice was relevant--e.g., "I have to inform you that I can in no way confirm anything that your child may confess to me. I will listen to what you have to say, and I will hear you out regardless of whether what you say is relevant to your child's confessions or not. Nothing about the fact that I listen to you or how I respond can be construed as an endorsement of the idea that you are saying anything at all that is relevant. In fact, I may deliberately assume facial expressions that would be misleading on this point, just to keep the matter confused."
That, however, is a very unsafe course, and it would be better for the priest to refuse to listen to the advice.
The above deals with situations in which the priest could only have learned about the sin confessed in the sacramental forum. If the same sin was known to be known to the priest from independent sources, the situation would be different.
For example (and to use an uncommonly clear example for purposes of illustration), suppose the priest was in a bookstore with the parent and the child. While there, the priest and the parent mutually witness the child take a book off the shelf, slip it under his shirt, and walk out of the store without paying. So both the parent and the priest unambiguously know about the sin without the sacrament being involved. If the parent then turns to the priest and says, "You should know that Johnny suffers from kleptomania. He's receiving psychological treatment for it and often feels very guilty afterwards about what he has done. If this comes up in confession then you ought to tell him to listen to what his therapist is telling him to help him get over the problem" then the priest wouldn't need to go through the elaborate rigamarole I described above. In this situation saying, "Okay; good idea" wouldn't betray anything that the priest had learned in confession. Indeed, the confession wouldn't have occurred yet.
Between these extremes is a spectrum. In drawing a line on the spectrum regarding what the priest can't do without violating the seal, the line is to be drawn at the priest doing something that discloses information about what the penitent has told him in past confessions. This can happen either directly (e.g., "Thanks! Johnny confesses that to me all the time!") or indirectly (e.g., implying that Johnny may well confess this in the future, when the only ground the priest may be thought to have for supposing this is likely to be past confessions). In evaluating where the line is to be drawn in practical terms, the priest must err on the side of caution and do all that he can to not reveal information about past confessions, either directly or indirectly. In practice, refusing to listen to parental advice is likely to be the best way to do that.
However, if he has listened to the advice then the fact that he acts on it does not violate the seal. The seal protects information from going out of the confessional, not into it. If a priest hears good advice, from whatever source, that may be useful to him in confession (whether it is reading a moral theology manual or listening to an overly-intrusive parent) then there is no violation of the seal if he acts on that advice.
Would the priest not at least be under obligation to inform the penitent that he had spoken to his parents?
There is no canonical obligation in this regard. A priest is not bound to disclose to the penitent the sources that inform whatever advice he gives in the sacramental forum. Just as he isn't canonically obligated to tell the penitent what moral theology manual his advice comes from, he also isn't obligated to say whether a particular person (parent or otherwise) gave him the advice that he chooses to pass on.
One might argue that there is a moral or prudential obligation to tell the penitent that a parent has been talking to him--lest this fact come out later and cause a family ruction--but the same argument could be made that he should not reveal this on moral/prudential grounds (i.e., a family ruction would be more likely if he told on the parent).
Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (37)
October 02, 2006
Unacceptable Confirmation Programs
(Jimmy Akin)
A reader writes:
Our parish's confirmation program includes two years of worthless ("exploring your dreams") classes, and then an unnegotiably mandatory weekend sleep-over retreat. My son went on the retreat and had to deal with a room full of teenage boys at night telling dirty stories and teasing him for not wanting to look at photos of women in a car magazine. Also, the girls in their pajamas (do you know what teenage girls wear for pajamas?!) were mixing with the boys.
Actually, I don't know what teenage girls wear for pajamas these days, but I gather from the implication that it is not at all modest.
When I complained to the DRE, she accused me of being "judgmental," and didn't see anything wrong with what went on--the stories were "mild" and the models in the magazine weren't naked. When the girls and boys were together, they were supervised. So she doesn't think there was a problem--I'm over-reacting to something that was harmless and innocent. She and the pastor will not budge on the mandatory nature of the weekend retreat: if you don't go, you can't be confirmed.
This is a violation of the parents' natural law rights as the primary educators--including religious educators--of their children. The idea that a sleepover of any kind could be so essential to preparation for confirmation that those who do not participate iin it sould be denied one of the sacraments of Christian initiation, and thus be denied the fullness of Christian initiation, is unconscionable. This is a raw exercise of power in denying the sacraments to those who will not toe the line on a matter that is trivial at best and those involved in it sin gravely by denying the sacrament on this pretext.
This is like saying that you can't have baptism or the Eucharist or confession if you don't attend the sleepover.
Rome will agree with me on this point, by the way.
Next up for confirmation is my daughter, who's homeschooled. She is not used to this atmosphere. Like my son, she recognizes evil for what it is, no matter how "mild" it is compared to the stuff most teens are into. I cannot in conscience allow her to go on the retreat. I have every reason to expect the problems she encounters will be similar, and probably worse, because she spent half of a year in our parish school.
I will have to defer to you on this point. There are times in which, for the sake of the greater good, one must hold one's nose and do somehting unpleasant or even potentially risky. When children are born they are totally helpless and have to be shielded from countless risks, but since they will one day have to function as adults in society, they have to be eased into situations involving risks that in progressively greater ways approximate those they will face as adults. Whether the risks posed in this instance are unacceptable for your daughter is a serious question that should be given thoughtful consideration, but it is something that you would know far better than I, as you know both what has happened in the previous classes and what risks and situations your daughter can handle far better than I.
I do not want to switch parishes, because the others in the area aren't orthodox. In my parish, the pastor doesn't mess with the liturgy, and never intentionally preaches heresy.
My question: can I bring my daughter to my home state, where my parents have a pastor who would understand all of this, so that she can be confirmed along with the candidates in that parish? I would see that she is properly prepared (my husband is a Catholic high school religion teacher and well qualified to oversee her preparation). Is there any rule in canon law about being confirmed in your own parish? Would she need permission from anyone besides the pastor of my parents' parish?
In the Latin Church, canon law regarding who can administer the sacrament of confirmation is unusually complex. Frankly, the law is a mess, and I hope that a future edition of the Code of Canon Law will rectify the matter, both in terms of simplifying who can confirm and in establishing a mandatory age for confirmation (the patchwork of ages we have in the United States--ages which vary from one diocese to another and allow confirmation to be treated as a "coming of age" sacrament that leads to nonsense like co-ed sleepovers--is just set up to cause problems).
The short answer to your question is that it is possible that you could have your daughter confirmed by the pastor of your parent's parish. The law allows for that if certain conditions are met. Here are the relevant canons:
Can. 882 The ordinary minister of confir-mation is a bishop; a presbyter provided with this faculty in virtue of universal law or the special grant of the competent authority also confers this sacrament validly.
Can. 885 §2. A presbyter who possesses this faculty must use it for the sake of those in whose favor the faculty was granted.
Can. 887 A presbyter who possesses the faculty of administering confirmation also confers this sacrament licitly on externs in the territory assigned to him unless their proper ordinary prohibits it; . . .
If you put the highlighted clauses together, they sketch the framework under which the pastor of your parents' parish could confirm your daughter. He will not have the faculty by law to confirm her, so he would need a special grant from his own bishop (can. 882) to confirm either your daughter specifically or a group of people including your daughter (can. 885) and the fact that she is not a resident of his diocese would not be a barrier unless the bishop of your diocese prohibits it (can. 887).
If you're trying to get your parents' pastor to confirm her based on a mandate to confirm a group of people, you will need to make sure that the mandate he has includes your daughter. For example, if he is empowered to conduct confirmations for those who live in his parish then your daughter won't be included in the mandate since she doesn't live there but the the mandate is phrased more generally, such that he can perform confirmations within the territory of his parish then, if your daughter is in it at the time of the confirmation, she would fall within the scope of the mandate.
You'll also note that nothing here requires the permission of anyone in your parish or diocese, though it is required that your bishop not have prohibit your daughter from being confirmed in this way.
The problem with problematic pre-confirmation programs that you are encountering is a widespread one, and the faithful have tried a variety of means in dealing with it. I have also known of cases where people took their children down to Mexico to be confirmed by a bishop there. There have also been cases where they took their children to be confirmed by an SSPX bishop, and Rome ruled that doing this was not a schismatic act. The Code of Canons for the Eastern Churches also provides for the possibility of having Latin children confirmed by an Eastern priest.
There is a question in my mind, however, whether you should be exploring this kind of matter or whether you should take an entirely different approach. While the law allows for such things, in view of the signal that could be sent to your daughter by pursuing them and in view of the fact that you will have Rome on your side in avoiding the sleepover--and even the worthless classes themselves--a different potential course of action recommends itself.
According to the Code of Canon Law,
Can. 843 §1. Sacred ministers cannot deny the sacraments to those who seek them at appropriate times, are properly disposed, and are not prohibited by law from receiving them.
The Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments has interpreted this canon in such a way that diocesan policy is subordinated to the right of the faithful to receive the sacraments if they are otherwise qualified to receive it. Diocesan policy is then regarded as a template for ensuring the orderly administration of the sacraments, but exceptions must be made to it if sacramentally qualified members of the faithful insist on exercising their right to receive the sacrament.
Thus there was a case a few years ago in which the parents of an eleven year old girl wanted their child confirmed in a diocese which did not ordinarily perform confirmation until some time later. The matter was appealed to the CDW and the response came back that
As has been stated before, the Code of Canon Law legislates that Sacred Ministers may not deny the Sacraments to those who opportunely ask for them, are properly disposed and are not prohibited by law from receiving them (cf. can. 843 §1). Since it has been demonstrated that the girl possesses these requisite qualities, any other considerations, even those contained in the Diocesan Policy, need to be understood in subordination to the general norms governing the reception of the Sacraments.
The Congregation considers it useful to point out that it is the role of the parents as the primary educators of their children and then of the Sacred Pastors to see that candidates for the reception of the Sacrament of Confirmation are properly instructed to receive the Sacrament and come to it at the opportune time (cf. can. 890). Consequently, when a member of the faithful wishes to receive this Sacrament, even though not satisfying one or more elements of the local legislation (e.g., being younger than the designated age for administration of the Sacrament), those elements must give way to the fundamental right of the faithful to receive the Sacraments. Indeed, the longer the conferral of the Sacrament is delayed after the age of reason, the greater will be the number of candidates who are prepared for its reception but are deprived of its grace for a considerable period of time.
In conclusion, this Congregation for Divine Worship must insist, given the concrete circumstances of the case under consideration, that the opportunity to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation be extended to the girl as soon as is conveniently possible [SOURCE].
It therefore occurs to me that, rather than seeking confirmation for your daughter through an alternative means that the law provides for, it may be best to simply prepare your daughter for confirmation yourself and the inform your parish that you have done so and will be presenting your daughter for confirmation, omitting some or all of the parish's problematic confirmation program. I would say all this as graciously as possible and offer to demonstrate that the daughter has been suitably instructed. I would act as if it is assumed that this will not be a problem. If resistance is met, I would then show them the CDW letter linked above and explain how the principles in it relate to this situation. If resistance continues, I would elevate the matter to the attention of the bishop, and if a satisfactory solution is still not reached, I would elevate the matter to the attention of the CDW, at all times showing proper respect and politeness to the parties involved.
Whether you do this or pursue the plan you originally outlined or allow your daughter to go thorugh the problematic program and make up for its deficiences as best you can at home is a matter that you will ultimately have to decide based on your knowledge of the situation, and it is a judgement call, but I wanted to call your attention to another possibility that you may not have considered.
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Posted by Jimmy Akin in Canon Law | Permalink | Comments (64)
A Stunningly Bad Article
(Jimmy Akin)
I recently read an article that appeared in the current (Aug/Sept 2006) issue of Homiletic and Pastoral Review by Dr. David Carlin, professor of philosophy and sociology at the Community College of Rhode Island, that I thought was worthy of comment.
The article begins okay, like this:
I suppose all Catholics would agree that it would be totally inappropriate for a Catholic priest presiding over a wedding to conclude the ceremony by saying: "You have just entered into one of the most important of all human relationships -- but I would caution you not to think of it as being necessarily a permanent relationship. It is only as permanent as you would like to make it. If either of you would like to end your marriage tomorrow, you have a perfect right to do so. If you would like to remain married until death, you can do that too. It's all up to you. Don't feel constrained by the vows you have just taken. The vows are expressed in traditional language, and this respect for tradition is a lovely thing; but the vows don't really mean anything."
So far so good. All Catholics should agree that it would be totally inappropriate for a Catholic priest to say this at a wedding.
Unfortunately, the article then drives over a cliff:
Yet this is exactly what priests do say, at least by implication.
What is the ground Dr. Carlin offers for this astonishing assertion?
In the United States, despite its famous separation of church and state, priests perform two wedding ceremonies at the same time, a religious ceremony and a civil ceremony. The laws of the Church give the priest the power to perform a sacramental marriage, while the laws of our states give Catholic priests (as well as clergypersons from other denominations) the power to perform a civil marriage.
Dr. Carlin here makes several mistakes, and he ought to know better, because one of them pertains to his own field of study: philosophy. It is simply false that priests "perform two wedding ceremonies at the same time." Unless the priest is bilocating or pausing every few seconds to read a line from two different texts for wedding ceremonies, it is clear that he is only participating in one ceremony. That is an ontological fact, and as someone trained in philosophy, Dr. Carlin ought to recognize this fact.
It is this initial mistake that causes the rest of his argument to go over the cliff, though that is not the only mistake he makes. Just in the paragraph quoted above, he also mistakenly says that the laws of the Church "give the priest the power to perform a sacramental marriage." Not only is it not the priest who performs a sacramental marriage (the laws of Christ empower the baptized couple itself to do that; the priest is just the Church's facilitator of the sacrament; he "assists" at the wedding but does not perform it). He also ignores the facts that priests also assist at valid but non-sacramental weddings (as when a baptized person marries an unbaptized person) and that deacons and even lay people can assist at Catholic weddings.
We're already off to a very rocky start, but the main problem that causes Dr. Carlin's article to go so disastrously wrong is that he does not have his head wrapped around the fact that there is, in reality, one marriage that is taking place when a priest assists at a Catholic wedding ceremony. The couple do not have two marriages with each other--one sacramental and one civil, or even one valid and one civil. This is a category mistake. They have one marriage that is being celebrated according to the Catholic form of marriage and, if we're lucky, also recognized by the state.
It's not that way everywhere. In some countries the state does not recognize marriages performed in the Catholic Church, and they require the couple to have a separate, civil ceremony. The effects of this civil ceremony, in terms of bringing about a valid marriage, are precisely nil under most circumstances. If either party is a Catholic then they are bound to observe the Catholic form of marriage unless very unusual circumstances obtain, and as a result the civil marriage ceremony that their government forces them to go through does absolutely nothing with respect to bringing a valid marriage into existence. In such circumstances, the civil ceremony results in a legal fiction whereby the civil law comes to regard the couple as married even though, in reality, they are not.
This results in enormous confusion in these societies because the situation sends the message to couples that they are already married and can act accordingly. It increases the temptations against chastity that couples experience before they are actually married in the religious ceremony, and if they are poorly catechized it can lead them to see the religious ceremony as an optional add-on that they can get around to if they feel like it. They will be especially prone to this idea if they grow up seeing couples who are only civilly married and if they have friends who have just never gotten around to having it done. There can even be temptations to indefinitely delay the religious ceremony specifically so that the couple can get divorced later in case it doesn't "work out" and then marry somebody else. In other words, it encourages couples to shack-up in civil "trial marriages" before they decide if they want to get married to each other for real.
Because marriage is a unitary thing--you're either married or you're not--it gravely harms society, the institution of marriage, and the family if the government refuses to recognize where actual marriages are taking place (in the religious ceremony) and insists on the couple going through an invalid civil ceremony that pretends to render them married when in fact it doesn't. Adding that fictitious overlay to the situation can only bring confusion and grave harm, both to the society at large and in particular to the individuals who are led into grave sin by the temptations and confusion that is created.
We are fortunate here in America that state law recognizes it when valid marriages are brought into existence in the Catholic Church. In our situation the civil law is in these cases in harmony with the reality of the situation, and that sends the right message to the couple: You are now married--for real.
That civil law also has provisions that are contrary to reality (e.g., that the couple can sever their bond by divorce and then marry someone else, when in reality they can't) is a sad thing--which itself is one of the reasons that the institution of marriage has been so weakened in our country. If civil law tells people that they're divorced with the right to remarry then many of them will tend to act that way and, under the influence of their passions, they will act in defiance of what their Church teaches.
Long experience has shown that people take their cues from civil law as well as Church law. That's one of the reasons that social acceptance of divorce is so common. It's one of the reasons that social acceptance of abortion is so common. And it's one of the reasons that social acceptance of homosexuality is so common. Before the law changed on these points, social acceptance of all of them was far smaller than it is now. The farther out of line civil law gets with reality, the more people are led astray from reality.
As a result, it is jaw-dropping that in his article Dr. Carlin urges that the situation should be pushed even further out of line with reality by having Catholic priests "abandon their practice of performing civil marriages" and instead have the dual religious/civil marriage system that has been so detrimental to some countries.
Dr. Carlin is not clear on whether he wants priests to do this on their own initiative or whether the wants the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops--with the proper Vatican approvals--to pass norms requiring priests to "abandon the practice of performing civil marriages," though he makes no call for the latter.
His ground for this is that he thinks it would more sharply underline the differences between the Catholic idea of marriage and the distorted one that civil society has.
I can have some degree of sympathy for this argument. There can come a point when it is better for the Church to refuse to participate in civil institutions, but experience has shown that the situation of the Church and its members is worsened when this happens with the institution of marriage, for the reasons cited above.
The better strategy, as long as the Church is going to require Catholics to observe the Catholic form of marriage (which it does precisely so that it can control the content of the marriage preparation and ensure the validity of the celebration of the sacrament itself), is to say "What we are doing in our churches is marriage--real marriage, the only kind of marriage that counts. If the state recognizes that fact, great. If not, that harms society and the good of souls."
If the state were requiring that the Church import into its marriage preparation or marriage ceremonies material that is at variance with the Catholic understanding of marriage--for example, if California required that for the state to recognize Catholic marriages that the priest must explain to the couple their options regarding divorce and remarriage without annulment--then I would agree that the Church would have no choice but to defy civil law and perform marriages without them being recognized by the state.
But California has not yet done that, and as long as that is the case, Dr. Carlin's statement that Catholic priests are implicitly preaching the secular idea of marriage to the couples at whose weddings they preside is simply false.
The priest--if he is doing his job as a priest--performs his duties in accord with the mind of the Church--not just omitting information about the secular view of marriage but specifically warning couples against it.
It is false and defamatory to accuse priests of fostering the secular idea of marriage if they are doing precisely the opposite.
Even if a particular priest is lax in his duties in this regard, it remains false that by presiding at a wedding ceremony according to the laws of the Church that a priest is simultaneously performing a second ceremony that is out of accord with Church teaching. As the evidence of our senses clearly attests, he is participating in one ceremony--a Catholic one--that the laws of the state happen to recognize as having legal force.
One final note: If Dr. Carlin's s